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ABSTRACT	  
Contemporary political philosopher John Gray has recently asserted: 
“modern politics is a chapter in the history of religion.” Gray demonstrates how the 
roots of modern political violence can be traced back to Christianity. Furthermore, he 
sees Utopianism, “the Enlightenment project”, anthropocentrism and any notion of 
human meaning as all originating in the Christian notion of “salvation”. Gray argues 
that all of these ideas are disproven by values pluralism – the idea that human life 
consists of an incommensurable range of values. Gray is also critical of human 
beings technological appropriation of the world and the ecological crisis that this 
consciousness has precipitated. Gray claims that all forms of universalism are 
mistaken because they privilege a particular set of values at the expense of others. 
Gray offers a modus vivendi as a political construct that can appropriate the insights 
of values pluralism, without privileging any particular set of values. Despite 
considering Christianity (and its offspring) illusory, Gray asserts that the “myth of 
human meaning” is a “necessary illusion”; it is one that human beings cannot live 
without.  Gray’s argument, however, is beset with inconsistencies, including an 
implicit teleology, despite his explicit rejection of all teleology, and the tendency of 
his thought toward nihilism, undermining his proposal of a modus vivendi. In his own 
constructive proposal Gray inadvertently privileges values of peaceful coexistence 
and human flourishing. His own political vision has some similarities with the 
Christian vision of the ideal human life. Christian eschatology is examined through 
the work of Jürgen Moltmann, and the values of hope and love are highlighted as the 
ethical consequence of Christian eschatology, as opposed to the violence that Gray 
claims has been generated from it. Moltmann’s thought also reveals the resources 
present in a theological perspective that are able to resolve some of the 
contradictions between individuality and sociality and between human beings and 
nature. This has significant implications for the ecological crisis, which is also one of 
Gray’s central concerns. Finally, Martin Heidegger’s concept of Gelassenheit is 
examined as a point of common ground between Gray’s thought and a theological 
approach to the world of politics and nature. 
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CHAPTER	  1:	  INTRODUCTION	  
AN	  INTRODUCTION	  TO	  JOHN	  GRAY’S	  THOUGHT	  
John Gray is a political philosopher who has come to popular attention in 
recent times through his book Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other 
Animals.1 This book has drawn an original (if somewhat pessimistic) picture of 
human life, suggesting that human beings are of no more value than the other 
creatures that inhabit our planet. Our hubris in assuming we have a special destiny 
or telos in history is an error that can only end in either an ecological or sociological 
adjustment to the size of the unsustainable human population. The title draws its 
name from the straw animals used in ancient Chinese rituals, which were revered for 
the duration of the ritual and afterwards “trampled on and tossed aside.”2 It is this 
image that Gray thinks most aptly captures the (lack of) meaning of human life. More 
recently, in his Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia,3 Gray has 
argued that the rise of what he calls “apocalyptic violence” - such as the conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan - can be directly attributed to “utopian thinking”. Such thinking 
is itself a direct descendant of Christianity and a secularized version of Christian 
hopes for salvation and faith in a human telos or destiny. While this idea is not wholly 
original, Gray makes a compelling analysis of current world politics, attributing the 
major international conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan to a misplaced faith in progress, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   John	  Gray,	  Straw	  Dogs:	  Thoughts	  On	  Humans	  and	  Other	  Animals	  (London:	  Granta	  Books,	  2002).	  
2	  Ibid.,	  33-­‐4.	  
3	   John	  Gray,	  Black	  Mass:	  Apocalyptic	  Religion	  and	  the	  Death	  of	  Utopia	  (London:	  Allen	  Lane,	  2007).	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which he conceives of as a secular manifestation of repressed religious hopes. Also 
notable is Gray’s prediction of the recent international economic crisis, in his 
prescient False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism.4 
Gray departs from traditional Liberalism, and in particular responds to the 
Liberalism of J.S. Mill, arguing that “disabling incommensurabilities” hamstring his 
argument in On Liberty.5 He argues that Liberalism is unsustainable in light of values 
pluralism. For Gray, the difficulties presented by incommensurable values “plague[s] 
later liberal thinkers such as Isaiah Berlin and Joseph Raz who have sought to 
ground liberalism in a value-pluralist ethical theory,”6 and he maintains that “no 
thinker in Mill's liberal posterity has been able to demonstrate the universal authority 
of liberal ideals.”7 In his later work, Gray takes his critique even further, arguing that 
all forms of universal values are illusory and that there can be no rational 
construction of moral and ethical life. It is here that he draws on pessimistic 
philosophers such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, coming to similar conclusions 
about the ultimate meaninglessness of human existence. 
  
Gray’s contribution to the critique of universal politics is in his identification of 
Christian faith as the source of modern notions of progress and human destiny. 
Drawing on Norman Cohn, Gray demonstrates the Christian foundations of our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  John	  Gray,	  False	  Dawn:	  The	  Delusions	  of	  Global	  Capitalism	  (London:	  Granta	  Books,	  1998).	  
5	   John	  Gray,	  “Mill’s	  Liberalism	  and	  Liberalism’s	  Posterity,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Ethics	  4,	  no.	  1/2	  (March	  
2000):	  137-­‐165.	  
6	   Ibid.,	  137.	  
7	   Ibid.	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humanistic belief in political or technological salvation. Gray proposes that, while 
religion is an illusion, it is a necessary illusion that human beings cannot live without. 
Like sexual desire, repressed religious faith in human destiny re-emerges in altered 
forms. However, the destiny that Gray predicts for humanity is either one of 
extinction or at least a radical reduction of our population through a catastrophe of 
either ecological or political origins, as human consumption and instrumentalism 
toward nature makes scarcity of resources the most pressing issue for future 
politics. 
BACKGROUND	  
Born into a British, working-class family, Gray’s first academic appointment 
was in 1976 as a Fellow and tutor at Jesus College, Oxford University. He remained 
there for 21 years, eventually becoming Professor of Politics. He has served as a 
visiting professor at a number of American academic institutions (including Harvard 
University from 1985-6) and was Professor of European Thought at the London 
School of Economics and Political Science until his retirement from academic life in 
early 2008. As a regular columnist for The New Statesman and The Guardian, Gray 
has been an influential social and political commentator in Britain.8 Including Straw 
Dogs and Black Mass, Gray has authored fourteen books and co-authored 
numerous others in the area of Liberalism, values and modern politics. Described by 
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one commentator as “the most important living philosopher”9 Gray has had a 
significant impact on modern political discourse and in recent years has attracted a 
popular following through his more accessible books. 
VALUES	  PLURALISM	  AS	  THE	  END	  OF	  UNIVERSALISM	  
One of Gray’s central arguments is that Liberalism, of the sort that seeks to 
apply liberal values universally, is no longer viable in a world of plural values. Gray 
targets those who think that current Western-style democracy, and in particular 
American capitalist democracy, is an ideal form of government which should (and 
some believe will) be adopted universally. Gray’s early work critiques the idea of a 
universal liberal system and demonstrates that, due to the existence of 
‘incommensurable values’, there can be no universal system of any kind which 
captures the ideal human society and which should be (or could be successfully) 
implemented ubiquitously. In Post Liberalism Gray concludes: “...there are many, 
diverse and incompatible, forms of life in which human well-being may be realized. 
We can recognize as genuine forms of human flourishing a whole variety of forms of 
life, while at the same time recognizing that none of them is the best form towards 
which all others approximate.”10 Gray takes exception to Francis Fukuyama’s claim 
that “history, conceived as the history of conflict between rival ideologies and 
systems of institutions, is over, and liberal democracy has been revealed as the final 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	   Will	  Self,	  Taken	  from	  the	  back	  cover	  of	  Black	  Mass.	  
10	   John	  Gray,	  Post	  Liberalism:	  Studies	  in	  Political	  Thought	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  1993),	  66.	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form of human government.”11 There is no ideal political system in Gray’s thought, 
since there is no ideal way of life for humanity. 
  Gray’s understanding of “values pluralism” lies at the core of his critique of 
Liberalism. In particular the notion of “incommensurable values” undermines the 
ideal of universal liberal politics, which animates much of liberal theorizing. “Some 
varieties of the good life are neither better nor worse than each other, nor the same 
in value, but incommensurable,” writes Gray; “they are differently valuable.”12 It is 
the fact that there are plural values, many of which cannot be compared or 
combined in rational ways, which dooms the project of rationally constructing a 
liberal regime that is universally authoritative. Plural values, and more specifically the 
incommensurability of these values, means that no one value or system of values 
may rationally be privileged over others. Not even the attempt to safeguard a 
minimum of liberal values through the legislation of rights can be maintained in light 
of the incommensurability of values. Gray observes: “From Locke and Kant to Rawls 
and Hayek, a line of liberal thinkers have accepted that the goods of life clash, with 
no settlement of their claims being without loss; but they have sought to state 
principles of right and justice that stand aloof from these conflicts. If, however, the 
claims of justice embody values that are themselves incompatible and 
incommensurable, that version of the liberal project runs aground.”13 Gray refers in 
particular to the rights discourse prevalent in American politics, which creates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	   Ibid.,	  202.	  Gray	  refers	  to	  Fukuyama,	  Francis	  “The	  End	  of	  History?”,	  in	  The	  National	  Interest,	  no.16,	  
(Summer,	  1989),	  3-­‐18.	  
12	   John	  Gray,	  Two	  Faces	  of	  Liberalism	  (New	  York:	  New	  Press,	  2000),	  34.	  
13	   Ibid.	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intractable conflicts out of issues such as the abortion debate; issues he believes 
could best be resolved through political negotiation.14 
Gray draws heavily on the work of Isaiah Berlin for his understanding of 
incommensurable values and quotes him at length.15 The incommensurability of 
values refers to three types of conflict between and within values. The first is the 
competing claims that many values make, which cannot be reasonably (i.e. through 
use of reason) resolved. Gray uses an example that is worth quoting at length, in 
order to illustrate this idea: 
Say I have an understanding with a close friend to be on hand when she is in 
serious trouble; but in the circumstances this is an understanding that I can 
honour only by defaulting on a contractual engagement I have made to a 
business enterprise. What should I do? There is no answer that is right for 
every person or every circumstance; but what I do may still be right or wrong. 
I may try to assess the impact of the interests of my friend and the business 
of failing to honour each engagement. Further, I may consider how defaulting 
on each of them meshes with my goals. How significant a role do I expect my 
friend and my business relationships to play in the life I aim to lead? These 
considerations may tell in favour of one course of action. My decision in 
cases such as this need not be arbitrary or groundless, an acte gratuite for 
which no reason can be given. Nor need it be the expression of a sheer 
preference. Given the context of my history and my circumstances, my 
choice may be right or wrong.16 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	   John	  Gray,	  Enlightenment’s	  Wake:	  Politics	  and	  Culture	  at	  the	  Close	  of	  the	  Modern	  Age	  (New	  York:	  
Routledge,	  1995),	  7-­‐11.	  
15	   E.g.	  in	  Black	  Mass,	  277-­‐8;	  “Berlin’s	  Agonistic	  Liberalism”	  in	  Post	  Liberalism;	  Enlightenment’s	  
Wake,	  81,	  86;	  Two	  Faces	  of	  Liberalism,	  30-­‐1,	  39-­‐40,	  82,	  95.	   	  
16	   Ibid.,	  42-­‐3.	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There are times when loyalty and honour may come into conflict in a way in which 
there is no reasonable means to resolve the conflict without loss. These values can 
be said to be incommensurable since conflicts between them cannot be reasonably 
resolved, or even compared on a scale - they are of incomparable value.  
The second form of incommensurable values is that found within the 
application of a particular value; when justice, for example can be applied in various 
ways in a situation, where two or more options are no better or worse than each 
other, and where each option involves a measure of loss. In such situations, there 
are no rational ways of resolving such conflicts. Gray again gives illustrative 
examples of both kinds: 
[J]ust as there are conflicts among ultimate values that are incommensurable 
- between liberty and equality, equality and general welfare, say - so there 
are conflicts no less radical within liberty itself - conflicts among distinct 
liberties having incommensurable value. When the liberty of privacy 
competes with freedom of information, a trade-off must be made and a 
balance struck; but there is no comprehensive theory - no theory of the sort 
John Stuart Mill thought he possessed when he sought to found the ‘one 
very simple principle’ of On Liberty in the requirements of general utility - by 
which such conflicts among liberties might be arbitrated.17 
 
The third way in which values can be described as incommensurable is when 
different cultures have different ways of life, embodying different values. These ways 
of life are based on differing conceptions of ‘the good’ in human life, and often 
cannot be reasonably compared, since they each represent a form of human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	   Gray,	  Post	  Liberalism,	  66.	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flourishing which may be no better or no worse than any other. Gray writes: 
“Cultures differ not only in how they interpret virtues they have in common but in the 
virtues they recognize. What some praise as virtuous others may condemn as a vice. 
When cultures honour different virtues, it is sometimes impossible to compare the 
value of the ways of life in which they are embodied.”18 There is incommensurability 
even between different systems of value. The values of honour, wisdom and courage 
prized by Greek culture, for example, cannot be regarded as either better or worse 
than Christian values of love and mercy; they are incommensurable. 
Gray distinguishes the idea of “value pluralism” from relativism. The idea of 
relativism is dependent on a common way of life with shared ideas of ethics.19 
There, the conflicts arise from preferences and wants that conflict on a subjective 
level. In relativism personal preference is the final authority in ethics – personal 
preference being a shared value, a universally accepted good. However, this is really 
again reducing ethical life to only one form of life. In fact, Gray argues, there are 
many ways of life, which base their choices and decisions on values which they hold 
to be objectively of value, and it is these ways of life and the incommensurability of 
their values, rather than just the personal preferences of those who hold the value of 
relativist truth, which creates the kinds of conflicts which cannot be resolved fairly by 
any universally accepted, rational system of values. “The claim that values-pluralism 
is a species of relativism,” writes Gray, “depends on a radically holistic view of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	   Gray,	  Two	  Faces	  of	  Liberalism,	  35.	  
19	   Ibid.,	  52-­‐55.	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ethical life. That view is false to common experience.”20 Relativism is dependent on 
a culture that values it above other forms of truth. 
The consequence of incommensurable values is that there is no universal 
system of values that can be appealed to in order to resolve many types of conflict. 
For Gray, this undermines the form of liberal theorizing which aims to find “a rational 
consensus on the best way of life.”21 Incommensurable values signal the futility of a 
search for a rationally constructed, universal regime and thus falsify much of what 
can be called the liberal project over the last few hundred years. As demonstrated 
above, the upholding of (usually liberal) values in law through rights-based legislation 
is also doomed to failure, since rights are only the individualising of certain values. 
These “rights” make claims that are as incommensurable as the values they are 
derived from. The truth of incommensurable values “has large consequences” writes 
Gray. “It means that there can be no such thing as an ideally liberal regime. Because 
rights make conflicting demands that can be reasonably resolved in different ways, 
the very idea of such a regime is a mistake.”22 
Gray challenges the overarching philosophical construction of “the good life” 
in its universalizable forms. Incommensurable values demonstrate the falsity of such 
a project. In his view, philosophers “from Aristotle up to the present”23 have believed 
that the virtues (what is regarded as the good in human life) work together to form a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	   Ibid.,	  54.	  
21	   Ibid.,	  1.	  
22	   Ibid.,	  15.	  
23	   Ibid.,	  38.	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consistent whole, and it is this idea which is the foundation for any belief in a 
universal regime which can best sustain ideal human society. However, Gray 
believes this foundational idea to be a fiction. He writes: “If rational inquiry has failed 
to produce agreement on the best life, it is not because of any imperfection in human 
reason. It is because the idea of perfection has no sense in human life.”24 For Gray, 
there is no ideal human good; rather there are many goods, and many equally valid 
ways for human life to be expressed. 
Gray attributes the source of this error in philosophy to that form of 
rationalism which considers the idea of ‘the good’ to be a rationally apprehensible 
ideal.  However, Gray argues that the attempt to apply our rational categories to 
society is a mistake. Gray draws on the thinking of F.C. Hayek on this point, which 
Gray describes as ‘Kantian’: 
In its most fundamental aspect, Hayek’s thought is Kantian in its denial of our 
capacity to know things as they are or the world as it is. It is in his denial that 
we can know things as they are, and in his insistence that the order we find in 
our experiences, including even our sensory experiences, is the product of 
the creative activity of our minds rather than a reality given to us by the 
world, that Hayek’s Kantianism consists.25 
Elsewhere Gray argues that Hayek “identifies a limit to the powers of reason more 
severe than any Kant could have admitted ...our own minds, no less than the 
external world, must in the end remain a domain of mystery for us, being governed 
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by rules whose content we cannot discover.”26 This belief animates the core of 
Gray’s critique on Liberal values and his consequent attack on the Enlightenment 
“faith” in progress and, indeed, on any utopian thinking which asserts that the 
creation of a perfect human world is possible. In his assessment of Hayek’s thought, 
Gray concludes that: 
The dominant superstition of the Age of Reason is the belief that vital social 
institutions - the law, language, and morality, as well as the market - must be 
or can become products of conscious contrivance and control, if they are 
effectively to serve human purposes. This modern superstition results from 
an anthropomorphic transposition of mentalist categories to the life of 
society.27 
Gray traces this anthropocentric error in philosophy - the assumption that the 
rational categories that we use to describe reality are an accurate reflection of it - 
back to writing, which he believes gave humanity the ability to “invent a world of 
abstract entities and mistake them for reality.”28 This was the start of humanity 
separating itself from the natural world, and “an error of thinking”29 which created a 
whole history of thought, beginning with Plato’s abstractions of the Good, the 
Beautiful and the True. It is this legacy of abstract thought that Gray believes to be 
both a mistake in our thinking and the source of Western civilization’s history of war, 
tyranny and violence, since much of this history has sprung from humanity’s desire 
to pursue, uphold or enforce these abstract ideals.  
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THE	  ANTHROPOMORPHIC	  ERROR	  AND	  ITS	  CHRISTIAN	  ROOTS	  
“The anthropomorphic error” is another central theme in Gray’s thought, and 
one that Gray critiques most vigorously in Straw Dogs. Not only do we make rational 
errors in assuming that the external world corresponds to our rational categories of 
thought, we also assume that human life has some kind of meaning or “destiny”. For 
Gray, it is this anthropomorphism that (mistakenly) provides the foundation for the 
belief in “progress”. This is the central creed of secular humanism - that humanity is 
the final arbiter of meaning and truth in the world. We promote our humanist 
worldviews in opposition to the truth that we are value-less, or at least, of no more 
value than the other creatures of this planet. Gray believes that “human life has no 
more meaning than the life of slime mould.”30 The belief that humans have a 
privileged position in the world is a mistake and most of humanistic philosophy has 
been built upon that unchallenged assumption. Gray aligns himself with philosopher 
Arthur Schopenhauer, whom he considers to have held the same view that forms the 
basis for all of Gray’s thought: “that the free, conscious individual who is at the core 
of Christianity and Humanism is an error that conceals from us what we really are.”31 
And what we are, in Gray’s opinion, is “embodiments of universal Will, the struggling, 
suffering energy that animates everything in the world.”32 
Gray traces the roots of anthropocentrism and thus of humanism back to 
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Christianity. “Christianity’s cardinal error”33 stems from the doctrine that human 
beings are made in the image of God. It is this idea that Gray believes has founded 
anthropocentric thought: 
In Christian theism, value is an emanation of personality, human or divine; 
human beings have infinite worth because they partake of the divine 
personality that created them; and a world without personality, if such there 
could be, could not but be worthless. Denuded of its theistic framework and 
content, the idea of the human species as the source of value in the world, 
and of human relations with nature being instrumental ones in which human 
activities alone are value-creating, emerges in modern times as secular 
humanism, which from the Renaissance onwards is a defining element in the 
modern world-view.34 
Without a theistic foundation, however, anthropocentrism is no longer 
rationally defensible. The special place afforded human beings in history by 
secular humanism is only the re-emergence of repressed religious desires - 
desires that are ubiquitous and irreducibly human. 
THE	  NECESSITY	  OF	  RELIGION	  
In Black Mass, Gray insists that Religion is inescapable, given that “religion 
answer[s] to universal human needs.”35 While Gray believes that religions are not 
literally true, he argues that “they are myths that preserve in symbolic or 
metaphorical form truths that might otherwise be lost, and the mass of humankind 
will never be able to do without them.”36 Exactly what these beliefs are, Gray does 
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not elaborate on, but he insists that the desire for secularization – the removal of 
religion from society – “is a kind of contradiction, for it is defined by what it excludes. 
Post-Christian secular societies are formed by the beliefs they reject, whereas a 
society that had truly left Christianity behind would lack the concepts that shaped 
secular thought.”37 Gray argues that religion cannot be suppressed and that where it 
is attempted, it re-emerges in other forms. This idea is the foundation of his 
argument that the Christian belief in salvation is the source of utopian politics. When 
the millennial belief in salvation was repressed, it re-emerged in secular politics as 
utopian thinking; the religious belief in the salvation of humanity reappeared in 
secular form. Gray writes: “Like repressed sexual desire, faith returns, often in 
grotesque forms, to govern the lives of those who deny it.”38 Religion is an illusion, 
but it is an illusion that Gray thinks humanity cannot do without. 
‘PROGRESS’	  AS	  REPRESSED	  RELIGION	   	  
Gray extends his critique of Liberalism and the notion of a universal human 
ideal to the Enlightenment belief in “progress”; a belief that Gray also argues is 
founded in religion. Gray thinks the “faith” (as he calls it) in the idea that human 
history is steadily moving toward a universal human culture, is an error. He believes it 
to be a belief that has more to do with repressed religious longings than with any 
rational conception of history. The belief in a perfect human society is merely a 
secularised form of the Christian belief in salvation - a new heaven and earth where 
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human life is saved from all of its imperfections. In Heresies: Against Progress and 
Other Illusions, Gray writes: 
The thinkers of the Enlightenment saw themselves as reviving paganism, but 
they lacked the pagan sense of the dangers of hubris. With few exceptions, 
these savants were actually neo-Christians, missionaries of a new gospel 
more fantastical than anything in the creed they imagined they had 
abandoned. Their belief in progress was only the Christian doctrine of 
providence emptied of transcendence and mystery. 
Secular societies are ruled by repressed religion. Screened off from 
conscious awareness, the religious impulse has mutated, returning as the 
fantasy of salvation through politics, or - now that faith in politics is decidedly 
shaky - through a cult of science and technology.39 
Gray maintains this critique of progress, as a secularised form of Christian 
faith, in Black Mass,40 where he identifies the war in Iraq and the American attempt 
to export capitalist democracy there as “a utopian venture.”41 By this, Gray means it 
is in line with all liberal and Enlightenment thinking that shares “a dream of ultimate 
harmony. ... The pursuit of a condition of harmony defines utopian thought and 
discloses its basic unreality.” 42  Gray classes Communism, Nazism and even 
(particularly in his earlier book: Al Qaeda and What It Means To Be Modern43) radical 
Islam as all similarly utopian projects, founded on the same utopian “myth”. They all 
sought or seek the creation of an ideal world, a perfect human community. Gray 
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writes:  
Like Communism and Nazism, radical Islam is modern. Though it claims to 
be anti-Western, it is shaped as much by Western ideology as by Islamic 
traditions. Like Marxists and neo-liberals, radical Islamists see history as a 
prelude to a new world. All are convinced they can remake the human 
condition. If there is a uniquely modern myth this is it.44 
THE	  ILLUSION	  OF	  HUMAN	  DIGNITY	  
The error in Enlightenment thinking, and in particular in the belief in progress, 
is that it does not take into account the imperfectability of human nature and our 
inability to live in harmony with our environment. Gray outlines a philosophical 
anthropology in Straw Dogs that undermines any hope for a perfect human society, 
for the dream of progress. The idea that human beings can progress is, in Gray’s 
view, a Christian idea. Even when this idea appears in Darwinist thinking, it is 
“formed from cast off Christian hopes.”45 Gray believes that the beliefs expressed in 
Christianity are the same ones that are expressed, albeit in secular garb, in humanist 
ideas. 
Gray sees our being out of balance with the rest of the ecosystem as a 
distinctive feature of the human race. As we develop and grow as a species, we 
wreak havoc on the environment around us. “Throughout all of history…human 
advance has coincided with ecological devastation.”46 Our growing population and 
our misuse of the earth’s resources will eventually end badly for the human species. 
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Gray writes: “Humans are like any other plague animal. They cannot destroy the 
earth but they can easily wreck the environment that sustains them.”47  
In contrast to modern faith in progress, Gray predicts that the future will not 
be one of increasing rationality and mastery of nature through technological 
advance. Increases in technology, he points out, can be used as readily in the 
service of terrorism and tyranny as it can be used to further more altruistic human 
ends. “New technologies strengthen repressive governments as well as weaken 
them,” writes Gray; “The rulers of China did not try to hush up the massacre in 
Tiananmen Square; they filmed it on video cameras and used it as a warning to 
others.”48 Like the Christian faith in salvation, the belief in technological progress is 
simply that: a belief, without rational foundations. In fact, Gray considers a belief in 
progress through technological advance to be less rational than religious faith. He 
writes: 
For many, the promises of religion lack credibility; but the fear that inspires 
them has not gone away, and secular thinkers have turned to a belief in 
progress that is further removed from the basic facts of human life than any 
religious myth. When they look to technology to deliver us from accidents, 
from choice and even from mortality, they are asking from it something it 
cannot give: a deliverance from the conditions that make us human.49 
In Gray’s view the renunciation of anthropocentrism leads to the conclusion 
that humanity need not necessarily have a future at all. Gray subscribes to the “Gaia 
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Hypothesis”, which is “the theory that the earth is a self-regulating system whose 
behaviour resembles in some ways that of an organism,”50 and which suggests that 
if the human population becomes imbalanced, nature will restore equilibrium through 
natural ecological processes. Gray predicts that the future of mankind will either 
mean further conflicts motivated by the scarcity of resources; a reduction through 
attrition of the human population to a size more supportable by the planet; or 
perhaps even the extinction of the human species itself. It is only our naive 
anthropocentric “faith” that prevents us from seeing the likelihood of this fate. He 
writes: “If humans disturb the balance of the earth they will be trampled on and 
tossed aside. Critics of Gaia theory say they reject it because it is unscientific. The 
truth is that they fear and hate it because it means that humans can never be other 
than straw dogs.”51 
THE	  SOURCE	  OF	  PLURAL	  VALUES	  
While much of Gray’s work is focused on a critique of current political 
thought, he also outlines a constructive political philosophy that he believes to be 
the only viable option for politics in a pluralist society. Gray asserts that “the good” 
for any given culture or society springs from and cannot be separated from the 
particular “way of life” of that society. Goods can only be compared in particular 
social contexts. “Outside of their contexts in social practices, no value can be 
attached to goods such as justice and friendship. They acquire their meaning and 
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worth from the histories, needs and goals of human subjects and the ways of life to 
which they belong. Conflicts of value arise only in contexts given by forms of 
common life.”52 Some goods can only be understood in their contexts, and can only 
be compared in these particular contexts where conflicts can arise. Other goods, 
despite being what Gray describes as “anthropological universals,”53 can create 
conflicts that no other universal good can help to adjudicate between.  
Gray’s proposition that values spring from particular “ways of life”, as 
opposed to being derived from universally authoritative, rational categories, is 
derived from Isaiah Berlin’s “agonistic Liberalism”, which presents a form of 
Liberalism based on values pluralism. Agonistic Liberalism argues that people’s 
allegiance to any form of political life is often on the basis of a common culture or 
way of life protected by that regime, rather than to the rational principles that govern 
that political form. In fact, it is this common culture which gives rise to the values that 
shape a political structure. This is the source of values pluralism - what people value 
does not come from some universal humanity that they all share. Rather, they are the 
product of historic communities in particular contexts. Therefore, there are various 
ways of being authentically human. “This is, in effect,” writes Gray, “to deny the 
philosophical anthropology of the Enlightenment, by affirming that human identities 
are always local affairs, precipitates of particular forms of common life, never tokens 
of the universal type of generic humanity. It is also to give the central thesis of 
value-pluralism ... a political statement, by observing that the conflict of values arises 
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in political life, most fundamentally on the rivalry of ways of life that are mutually 
exclusive, even where they are also internally complex.”54 
MODUS	  VIVENDI	  
In view of the irreducible plurality of human identities and values, Gray argues 
that the form of Liberalism that must be pursued (if Liberalism is to have a future) is 
that form which provides for the peaceful coexistence of differing ways of life. In The 
Two Faces of Liberalism, Gray makes it clear that the form of liberalism that seeks “a 
rational consensus on the best way of life”55 has no future. Rather, Liberalism as “a 
project of coexistence that can be pursued in many regimes”56 is the only form of 
Liberalism that Gray considers legitimate in our plural societies. If there are plural 
values, which cannot be reasonably arbitrated between, then the function of politics 
cannot be to institute a ‘best’ way of life (since that notion, for Gray, is nonsensical). 
Rather, values pluralism leads to, “a conception of political life as a sphere of 
political reasoning whose telos is a modus vivendi, to a conception of the political in 
which it is a domain devoted to the pursuit not of truth but of peace.”57 The 
animating value for politics must be toleration and the pursuit of a modus vivendi - a 
peaceful coexistence - whereby all ‘ways of life’ that embody some form of human 
flourishing are allowed to exist and cohabit as far as that is possible.  
Conceiving of the political project as the pursuit of modus vivendi then 
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prioritizes the need for negotiation and compromise in politics. The value of any 
political regime lies, then, not in its ability to promote a particular way of life, nor to 
protect a way of life through the legislation of “rights”; rather, its value lies in its 
ability to settle conflicts between various ways of life. As Gray contends: “the 
account of modus vivendi I have defended does not aim to prescribe principles of 
right that are independent of particular conceptions of the good. Instead, it judges 
regimes in terms of their capacity to mediate compromise among rival views of the 
good. The result is a liberal philosophy in which the good has priority over the right, 
but in which no one view of the good has overall priority over all others.”58 As the 
pursuit of modus vivendi, politics becomes the arbiter of peaceful toleration, rather 
than institutionalising one way of life as best or ideal over all others.  
SUMMARY	  
In summary, John Gray’s main concern is to critique those versions of 
Liberalism that conceive of themselves as embodying universal values which should 
be adopted by all human cultures.  Gray’s critique stems from his assertion of 
values pluralism and his belief that it undermines the rational foundations that 
universal values rest on. Gray contends that the rationalism of (what he labels) “the 
Enlightenment Project”, which seeks to define the ultimate human good, is a 
doomed project, undermined by the truth that many ultimate values are 
“incommensurable” and as such incombinable, such that no coherent definition of a 
human summun bonum is possible. Further, not only does Gray believe that ultimate 
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goods are a chimera; he also asserts that the notion of ‘progress’ as continual 
improvement of human social and political institutions is likewise impossible and is 
more akin to a secular ‘faith’ than rational thought. The only realistic political project 
open to us, in Gray’s view, is the realistic acceptance of plural values and the need 
for political negotiation in the pursuit of peaceful coexistence and a “modus vivendi”; 
a political space for all types of human flourishing in both Liberal and non-Liberal 
forms. Furthermore, Gray casts doubt even on the future of humanity as a whole, 
citing our anthropocentrism as an epistemological error inspired by Christian beliefs, 
which has lead to the destruction of our planet’s resources. In Gray’s opinion, the 
human population has become so large and out of harmony with the earth that an 
ecological adjustment of the population is imminent, arising either from conflicts 
engendered by the scarcity of resources, or else an ecological failure of the planet to 
support human consumption at present levels. The idea that belief in a human telos 
is an illusion is worth analyzing, since it is central to Christian claims about the world. 
It also has significance for the political project as a whole, as Gray has 
demonstrated. A key aspect of Gray’s claim about teleological belief is that it is an 
illusion – but one that he describes as “necessary”. 
  
CHAPTER	  2:	  A	  HISTORY	  OF	  VIOLENCE	  
JOHN	  GRAY’S	  THESIS	  IN	  BLACK	  MASS	  
In Black Mass: Apocalyptic Violence and the Death of Utopia,1 Gray makes 
three significant claims about modern “apocalyptic violence” that are worth 
analyzing in depth here. The first is that modern politics is what he terms “utopian”; it 
is animated by the telos of a perfect world that it seeks to create. All such utopian 
thinking is doomed, in Gray’s opinion, by the existence of plural and 
incommensurable values, which implies that there cannot be a single telos for 
human life toward which politics may strive. Gray’s second claim is that all such 
utopian thinking in modern politics is merely the re-emergence of repressed 
(Christian) religious ideas. Specifically, Gray identifies anthropocentrism (the 
privileged place of human beings in the world) and teleology (the notion that human 
history has a goal, and hence, meaning) as two Christian fundamentals that have 
shaped the modern utopian (and broader Enlightenment) tradition. Both of these 
ideas he sees as erroneous, disproved, again, by the truth of values pluralism. 
However, despite being “illusions”, he regards these ideas as necessary; illusions 
that human beings cannot seem to live without. His third claim is that utopian politics 
is ultimately violent. In the desire to create a perfect world in the future, the peace of 
the present is sacrificed. Those who use terror to create their utopias believe that 
human nature may be altered through the use of terror, so that a perfect society may 
be created. Finally, Gray proposes that a modus vivendi is a legitimate way to found 
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political regimes in a way that does not privilege a particular set of values over any 
other in society. The goal of a modus vivendi is to promote peaceful coexistence 
between a diversity of ways of life, without expecting society to converge on one 
particular set of ultimate values.  
THE	  FUTILITY	  OF	  ‘UTOPIAN’	  POLITICS	  
In Black Mass John Gray argues that modern politics is ‘utopian’. By this he 
means that it seeks the creation of an ideal society. He writes: “Modern politics has 
been driven by the belief that humanity can be delivered from immemorial evils by 
the power of knowledge. In its most radical forms this belief underpinned the 
experiments in revolutionary utopianism that defined the last two centuries.” 2 
Among those political projects that Gray identifies as utopian, Communism is the 
most salient. However, Gray describes more recent political movements as also 
utopian; in particular he highlights the American invasion of Iraq as an attempt to 
apply the utopian ideal of capitalist democracy universally:  
Towards the end of the last century the pursuit of Utopia entered the political 
mainstream. In future only one kind of regime would be legitimate: 
American-style democratic capitalism – the final form of human government 
… Led by the United States, western governments committed themselves to 
installing democracy throughout the world.3 
Like Communism before it, the modern “war on terror” and the attempt to establish 
democracy in Iraq is another attempt at creating an ideal world by political (and, 
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   Ibid.,	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eventually, by violent) means. It is merely the vision of perfection that has changed; 
the use of violence as a means to bring the ideal into existence stems from at least 
as far back as the French Revolution, as will be demonstrated later in this 
discussion. 
Gray traces the use of the word “Utopia” to Sir Thomas More’s book of 1515,4 
which described a perfect society. Since then, it has been used to refer to ideal 
communities, many religious, which have sprung up both to reform wider society 
and to escape from it.5 Gray begins with Isaiah Berlin’s definition of utopianism, 
which is as follows: 
All the Utopias known to us are based on the discoverability and harmony of 
objectively true ends, true for all men, at all times and places. [Utopian 
societies] rest on three pillars of social optimism in the West … that the 
central problems of men are, in the end, the same throughout history; that 
they are in principle soluble; and that the solutions form a harmonious 
whole.6 
Gray reiterates Berlin’s assertion that “a core feature of all utopias is a dream of 
ultimate harmony.”7 All utopian thinking perceives an ideal system in which there is 
a lasting and harmonious peace, and they all seek to achieve this (impossible) set of 
conditions. It is this feature that ensures the failure of all utopian dreams.  
 The utopian dream of “ultimate harmony” is a flaw that dooms all such 
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projects. “The pursuit of a condition of harmony,” writes Gray, “defines utopian 
thought and discloses its basic unreality. Conflict is a universal feature of human 
life.”8 There is no possibility for a conflict-free existence for humanity - which is why 
every pursuit of one has failed. Gray regards all utopian thinking as ‘flawed’ precisely 
because it does not consider the problems of society to be reflections of its 
members; instead, utopian thinking identifies the source of society’s problems as 
being the result of imperfect systems which repress humanity. Writing of the 
academic classes, Gray defines utopian thinking in them as: “the rejection of 
imperfectability in human affairs. It denies the idea cherished in the Christian and 
Jewish traditions that human life will always be imperfect and in some part tragic.”9 
It is this fundamental imperfection of human life that guarantees the failure of all 
utopian projects. 
Gray defines utopian projects as “unrealizable” because they pursue a form of 
life which human beings are not capable of living, or because they try to achieve a 
transformation of human nature.10  He writes: “A project is utopian if there are no 
circumstances under which it can be realized.”11 In particular he highlights any 
political vision of a society that is without the need for “coercion and power”;12 
however, he adds that a project is similarly utopian if it is “unrealizable under any 
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circumstances – it is enough if it can be known to be impossible under any 
circumstances that can be brought about or foreseen.”13 It is in this second category 
of utopianism that he locates the establishment of western-style democracy in 
post-Saddam Iraq; it is a project that he considers unrealizable. Gray criticizes those 
who have pursued it, for subscribing to an erroneous type of thinking which ascribes 
the history of intractable conflicts in Iraq to repressive political structures, rather than 
to a flawed and conflictual human nature. “For the utopian mind,” writes Gray, “the 
defects of every known society are not signs of flaws in human nature. They are 
marks of universal repression.”14 Therefore, Gray regards as utopian those projects 
that are founded on the belief that all human conflicts will be resolved under an ideal 
regime. They are utopian because they believe that “political action can bring about 
an alteration in the human condition.”15 This idea, and its connection to the use of 
violence, will be explored in more detail in the latter part of this thesis. 
For the same reason that Gray identifies utopian projects as unrealizable, he 
regards the modern idea of progress to be a “myth”. In fact, he regards all 
“Enlightenment thinking” to be founded on the same error: the idea of history as 
progress. Gray identifies this animating belief as “faith” – as opposed to a fact. He 
describes this “Enlightenment faith” as the belief that “humanity is evolving towards 
a universal civilization.”16 Bound up with this belief is “the myth that humanity is 
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moving towards adopting the same values and institutions.” 17  For Gray, the 
foundation of the belief in progress and of Enlightenment thinking is the belief that 
humanity is converging on a universal culture and politics that will remove all conflict 
from human life. In Al Qaeda and What It Means to be Modern,18 Gray describes the 
Western “myth” of progress as the belief “that, as the rest of the world absorbs 
science and becomes modern, it is bound to become secular, enlightened and 
peaceful.”19 It is faith in this telos of a peaceful and universal humanity that Gray 
considers an illusion. It is an illusion he believes to be disproven by the truth of 
values pluralism. 
VALUES	  PLURALISM	  
Values pluralism is an argument about the nature of reality, and of human 
nature, on which Gray’s entire political theory rests. It is the view that there are many 
values that are incommensurable; that is, they cannot be compared, combined or 
otherwise rationally evaluated in order to establish either a hierarchy or a unified 
system of values. This perspective runs counter to much of the history of (Western) 
philosophy which, going at least as far back as Plato, has pursued an articulation of 
“the Good, the True and the Beautiful” as the ultimate goal of human life. In his Two 
Faces of Liberalism 20  Gray argues for a form of Liberalism based on values 
pluralism. In his explication of values pluralism, he writes:  
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The human good is shown in rival ways of living…. Value pluralism was a 
truth about human life before it was an inescapable social condition. There 
have been many attempts to explicate it. What all have in common is the 
proposition that there are many kinds of good life, some of which cannot be 
compared in worth. Some varieties of the good life are neither better nor 
worse than each other, nor the same in value, but incommensurable; they are 
differently valuable. Similarly, some regimes are neither more nor less 
legitimate than one another. They are legitimate for different reasons.21 
Gray’s understanding of values pluralism is largely drawn from the political 
theorist Isaiah Berlin, who advocates for a form of Liberalism that he calls “agonistic 
liberalism”. In a chapter devoted to Berlin’s agonistic Liberalism, Gray summarizes 
two of Berlin’s central ideas: values pluralism and incommensurability. 
Berlin’s master idea is that ultimate values are objective and knowable, but 
they are many, they often come into conflict with one another and are 
uncombinable in a single human being or a single society, and that in many 
of such conflicts there is no overarching standard whereby the competing 
claims of such ultimate values are rationally arbitrable. Conflicts among such 
values are incommensurables, and the choices we make among them are 
radical and tragic choices. There is, then, no summum bonum or logos, no 
Aristotelian mean or Platonic Form of the Good, no perfect form of human 
life, which we may never achieve but towards which we may struggle, no 
measuring rod on which different forms of human life encompassing different 
and uncombinable goods can be ranked.22 
Gray notes that the “distinctiveness and radicalism of Berlin’s species of objective 
pluralism are easily missed.”23 As has been demonstrated in the previous chapter, it 
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is not to be confused with relativism, which denies the objectivity of values. Berlin 
agrees that ultimate values are objective and universal. But they can also be 
incommensurable. 
Incommensurability is the key idea in understanding values pluralism. As 
outlined in the introduction, Gray discusses three kinds of incommensurability: 
Incommensurability between values, such as the competing demands made by 
justice and mercy; Incommensurability within values, such as the application of the 
value of freedom, when the freedom of the Paparazzi to take photos conflicts with 
the freedom of celebrities to have privacy; and incommensurability in the way that 
different cultures or ways of life honour different values, such as the difference 
between the Swiss who honour punctuality and Pacific Islanders who honour 
tolerance and acceptance. In each of these cases, the choice that is made between 
each value or each application of that value must be a radical choice as opposed to 
a rational choice.24 However, this does not mean that there can be no rational 
reasons for choosing between incommensurables – only that there is not one best 
way to choose between them. Gray writes: “If goods such as friendship and money 
cannot be compared in value, neither can the lives of people who make different 
choices between them. Yet such choices are not arbitrary. Our histories and 
circumstances, our needs and goals, may give good reasons for different choices.”25  
The decisions made between incommensurables are, in Gray’s words, 
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“agent-relative”;26 however, this does not mean they are purely subjective. It means 
that there are different ways of combining goods within a particular way of life. Many 
of them could be rationally judged to be of lesser value and many of them could be 
judged equally good. What incommensurability indicates is that there is no perfectly 
rational system for arbitrating between many values, because, as Gray writes: “The 
best life for human beings comes in many varieties, some of which cannot be 
combined. There is no one best or maximal form of life for humans.”27 There is no 
one best way of life, of which all others are approximations. There are many ways to 
choose between incommensurables, and these will depend on the way a particular 
person chooses to combine them, in accordance with the many variables of their life, 
not on rational principles that logically privilege some values over others. 
Values can be incommensurable and yet they can be compared and rationally 
compared within particular contexts and ways of life. Using the example of justice 
and friendship, while they may be incommensurables when discussed abstractly, 
they can be (and in practice must be, and regularly are) reasoned about and decided 
among in particular contexts. If I must choose between a promise made to a friend 
and a legally binding contractual agreement, only my context, with its history and 
conventions, can enable me to reason and choose between the two. “Outside of 
their contexts in social practices,” writes Gray, “no value can be attached to goods 
such as justice and friendship. They acquire their meaning and worth from the 
histories, needs and goals of human subjects and the ways of life to which they 
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belong.”28 Many of the goods we value are socially determined; as explained above, 
the incommensurability of values sometimes arises from the different value accorded 
to goods by different cultures or ways of life. However, this is not to say that all 
human values are determined by their contexts. Gray writes: “Incommensurable 
goods are by no means always constituted by social conventions. Some are 
anthropological universals.”29 This, inevitably, leads into questions of philosophical 
anthropology. To what extent is there a universal “human nature” with shared 
universal values? Is human identity just a construct of the social context in which it 
develops, or is there a generic core to what we are as human beings? 
GRAY’S	  PHILOSOPHICAL	  ANTHROPOLOGY	  
Again, Berlin’s thought underpins Gray’s understanding of the source of 
human values and identity. And it is this understanding of philosophical 
anthropology that is at the core of Berlin’s (and thus of Gray’s) critique of both 
Liberalism and Enlightenment thinking: that human identities and values are not 
purely universal, but to a larger extent determined by our cultural and historical 
contexts. It is worth quoting Gray’s summary of Berlin’s thought on this point, at 
length: 
It was a cardinal tenet of the Enlightenment that, whatever cultural variety the 
future of mankind [sic] would encompass, it was reasonable to expect 
convergence on a universal civilization undergirded by a shared, rational 
morality. If the upshot of Berlin’s value-pluralism is to undermine the idea of a 
rational morality, the effect of his work on nationalism is to jettison the 
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prospect that a time may come when men’s dominant allegiance is to the 
norms of a universal civilization. The crux in Berlin’s thought goes yet deeper 
than this. It is in a tension between the idea of a common human nature and 
the idea of human self-creation and self-transformation. If, as Vico, Herder 
and Berlin maintain, we are a highly inventive species whose forms of life are 
radically undetermined by our common humanity, what reason is there to 
share the hopes of the Enlightenment for an eventual convergence of liberal 
and humanistic values?30 
Berlin’s insight is one that runs counter to much of modern thinking: being human is 
not a universally shared experience, identical wherever it is found.  
Human beings are children of place and history, and their identities are as 
much a self-creation (in fact more a self-creation, in Berlin’s thinking) than an 
inherent “human nature” that is common to all. And this self-created nature is core to 
our identity – not a surface feature of a deeper, universal humanity. The error of 
conceiving of human beings as “abstract instances of the human species,”31 is one 
that Gray locates as present in the heart of all utopian regimes. For example, Gray 
critiques Marxist philosophical anthropology as follows: 
[It] seeks to expunge the cultural inheritances of mankind, and thereby also 
to roll back the most powerful achievements of the modern world in the 
interests of a mythic entity – that of universal humanity. … Marxian 
philosophical anthropology is committed to the view that all the forms of 
human identity which have achieved concrete historic realization are 
aberrations, unavoidable episodes (perhaps) in the growth of human 
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productive powers, but nevertheless episodes which conceal rather than 
disclose the human essence.32 
It is this “myth” of universal human nature which values pluralism serves to unmask, 
and which by extension undermines the concomitant myth of a universal ideal for 
society, which Gray insists is the animating telos of Liberalism, the belief in progress 
and the entire Enlightenment project of Western society.  
 Gray’s early work focused his critique on Liberalism and its pretensions to 
universal authority by claiming to be founded on universal human values. In his 
analysis of Liberalism’s foundations, Gray highlights its limited understanding of 
human nature which ignores the historical and culture-bound aspects of the liberal 
human being, universalizing for all times and all peoples, traits which have arisen out 
of a specific cultural history. Gray concludes: 
If the supposedly universal principles of liberal political morality dissolve into 
indeterminacy on analysis, we can then begin to perceive the spuriousness 
of liberal notions of universal humanity and abstract personhood – notions 
whose only value is to summarize or abbreviate (very imperfectly) certain 
passages in the historic experience of specific liberal societies. A central 
disability of liberal ideology, then, in addition to the indeterminacies infecting 
its constitutive principles, is its blindness to the historical singularity of its 
distinctive forms of self-identity and self-understanding. If we abandon the 
delusive perspective of universality, however, then we can see liberal society 
as a historical achievement, an inheritance of institutions and traditions 
which informs our thought and practice in profound ways, but which we are 
bound to acknowledge has no universally apodictic character.33 
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It is this understanding of the hegemony of Liberalism that informs Gray’s 
understanding of modern political positions. His central critique of modern politics is 
of the tendency to enshrine in universal terms a particular, historical form of human 
self-understanding and to seek to make it applicable to all people and all cultures, 
ignoring the way that human identities spring from culture, tradition, practices and 
“ways of life”. 
However, not only does Gray reject the notion that humanity is a universal 
essence that we are all instances of; he also critiques the claim of communitarians, 
that contextualized human identities are singular and uniform and are best 
represented by nationalist politics. In Gray’s view, while the forms of life in which we 
participate largely constitute our particular identities, we are no more defined by 
these contexts than we are by any universal human essence. Gray writes:  
The conservative theorist, like the communitarian critic of liberalism from the 
Left, moves unreflectively from the truth that we are none of us 
[un]encumbered or disembodied selves to the very different, and indeed 
manifestly false proposition that we are, or ought to be radically situated 
selves – that is to say … selves whose identity is contoured by membership 
in a single moral community and mirrored in the institutions of a single 
political order.34 
Rather, Gray insists that human identity is more complex; we are the products of 
various - and at times conflictual - inheritances and traditions. This is essential to 
being human, since “the power to conceive of ourselves in different ways, to harbor 
dissonant projects and perspectives, to inform our thoughts and lives with divergent 
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categories and concepts, is integral to our identity as reflective beings.”35 It is this 
belief that there is no “deep, undergirding moral community” in our modern 
societies, which leads Gray to conclude: “government is ill-fitted to act as guardian 
or protector of any of the traditions it shelters.”36 It is also what prompts him to offer 
his constructive proposal of modus vivendi as the best model of government in a 
pluralist society.  
However, Gray does believe there is such a thing as ‘human nature’. What, 
then, remains if we are neither defined by a universal nature, nor by the notion of a 
uniform, local identity? Gray believes that what human beings share (along with all 
other animals) is that we are motivated by our needs - our conflicting and animal 
needs. Gray insists that: “the Counter-Enlightenment belief that there is no such 
thing as human nature is as much an illusion as the Enlightenment idea of universal 
humanity. Like other animals, humans have a common nature that is fairly constant 
in its needs. It is this common nature that underlies universal goods and evils. It is 
also what accounts for their universal conflicts.”37  Again, in Black Mass, Gray 
asserts:  
Contrary to the thinking of post-modernists who believe all human values are 
cultural constructions and reject the idea of human nature, there are some 
values that reflect universal human needs. But these needs are many and 
discordant, and universal values can be embodied in different ways.38  
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We are not creatures finely tuned to perceive the rational or moral nature of the 
universe and to structure our lives accordingly. Rather we are “like other animals”39 – 
without meaning or destiny. We are not the autonomous, rational, moral beings that 
we presuppose; rather: “Like other animals, we are embodiments of universal Will, 
the struggling, suffering energy that animates everything in the world.”40 We have 
universal needs – like the need to survive and to flourish. But even these most 
universal features of human nature cannot undergird a universally applicable form of 
life, since they conflict with each other. As Gray explains: 
Universal human values are often rivals. When universal values collide there 
are no universal principles for settling their conflicts … Which is better – a 
regime which ensures peace but in which many are malnourished or one that 
is plagued by fatal violence but in which no-one starves? There is no answer 
that all reasonable people are bound to accept.41 
 This example illustrates Gray’s position that our needs, while universally felt, are 
conflictual and not reducible to a coherent, rationally unified system of thought. 
Gray maintains the existence of “universal evils”. These evils are defined in 
reference to Gray’s affirmation of universal human needs. Some evils are universal in 
that they stifle needs that are universal. Gray explains:  
The claim that there are generically human evils ... rests on the fact that the 
experiences to which these evils give rise are much the same for all human 
beings, whatever their ethical beliefs may be. The constancy with which 
these experiences are found, across remote cultures and distant epochs, 
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reflects a constancy in human nature, not an agreement in opinions. Like 
other animals, humans have a stock of needs that does not change much, 
and which constrains the forms of life in which they can thrive. Whenever the 
thwarting of a generically human need renders a worthwhile life unattainable, 
there is a universal evil.42 
There are universal needs, and the ‘thwarting’ of these needs is an evil that is 
universal. Hence, the forms that the ‘good’ human life can take are limited by these 
needs. In order for a way of life to be a ‘good’ form of life, it needs to be one in which 
the universal human needs are catered for. Gray does not seek to define what the 
human needs are, nor does he define the correlative ‘evils’ which apply to all. He 
insists: “There can be no definitive list of the conditions which endanger a 
worthwhile human life.”43  
However, Gray identifies some of the general kinds of “evils” which this list of 
“universal evils” would contain: “to be tortured … to be separated from one’s 
friends, family or country; to be subjected to humiliation or persecution or threatened 
with genocide; to be locked in poverty or avoidable ill-health – these are great evils 
for all who suffer them.” 44  These universal evils are, like universal needs, 
incommensurable, in that they cannot all be avoided equally. Rather, “differing ways 
of life come partly from divergent settlements among universal evils.”45 While these 
universals cannot underwrite the universalizing of a particular way of life, they can 
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mark out the boundaries of “the good life” and hence can in some way make 
universal moral claims. Gray explains: 
Strong pluralism does not reject all universal moral claims. It does not deny 
that there are universal, pan-cultural goods and bads. It affirms their reality. It 
sees such universal values as marking boundary conditions beyond which 
worthwhile human lives cannot be lived.46 
Gray does not resist the universalizing of the general values of “the good life” or 
“human flourishing”; rather, he resists any particular settlement of values that claims 
to be the one, unique form of the good life. The good life, for Gray, is plural. 
This clarifies Gray’s thought on universal values in important ways. 
Incommensurability is not the claim that there are no universals to guide human life. 
In Gray’s view, we have definite needs, the fulfillment of which is a good and the 
thwarting of which is an evil. What incommensurability claims is, firstly, that human 
societies are not perfectible. By this Gray means a very specific kind of perfectibility: 
one where every good is maximized and every evil minimized to the highest degree. 
“No regime can truly claim to embody the best settlement of conflicts among 
universal values.”47 There will always be different settlements of conflicts in value 
that are equally valid.  
This leads us to the second insight that Gray draws from the 
incommensurability of values: human life can flourish equally well in a variety of 
regimes. He writes: “Disputes about which regime is everywhere best are without 
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sense. The diversity of regimes is like the diversity of goods. It is not a mark of any 
lack in human life. It is a sign of the abundance of good lives that human beings can 
live.”48 Elsewhere he writes: “Strong value pluralists believe that there are irreducibly 
many varieties of human flourishing.” 49  This is among the most positive of 
statements that Gray makes concerning politics and human life. Incommensurability 
is, from one side, a celebration of the plurality of equally good lives that human 
beings can live. From another side, it is used to undermine the notion of human life 
having any kind of telos or sense of meaning. For Gray, a telos must be a monadic 
vision without room for diversity or plurality. There can be only one “good” if human 
life is to have a meaning that can orient its progress toward an ideal society. 
This reveals a further distinction in Gray’s thinking that is subtle but important 
to understanding his argument. There can be no universal incarnation (to use a word 
that, while philosophically loaded, will be useful in my later critique of Gray) of the 
universal goods in human life. While there are universal goods (which Gray attests to, 
even if he does not seek to define them), they cannot be applied to human life in one 
best way. He writes: “Different regimes need not be approximations to any ideal 
type. Indeed they cannot be.”50 This is because there can always be another way of 
“incarnating” the universal goods which is equally as good as another. That truth 
cannot be reduced to a single incarnation in human life disproves its existence to 
Gray. His implicit assumption is that truth must lead to a singular outcome if it is to 
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have a universal claim. It is useful to quote Gray at length on this crucial idea: 
Objective pluralism carries with it the implication that there is a radical moral 
scarcity which it is our fate as humans to endure. In the form in which it is 
most subversive of the classical foundations of Western civilization, this 
species of pluralism denies the coherence of the Form of the Good, as 
theorized by Plato, and rejects the thesis of the unity of the virtues, as 
advanced by Aristotle. In this pluralist view, not only are all genuine goods 
not necessarily harmonious, but goods may depend for their existence upon 
evils, virtues on vices. In this aspect, pluralism is a variation on the theme of 
the imperfectability of human life, traceable back to Jewish and Christian 
sources. In its deepest implication, however, pluralism does not mark the 
imperfection inherent in the nature of things: it destroys the very idea of 
perfection. It thereby strikes a death-blow at the classical foundation of our 
culture, expressed not only in Plato and Aristotle, but in the Stoic idea of the 
logos and in Aquinas’s conception of a world order that was rational and 
moral in its essence, even as it was the creation of the Deity, one of the 
central attributes of which was perfection.51 
It is at this point that Gray’s philosophical anthropology and his epistemology meet. 
Given the plurality of ways that values can be worked out, Gray concludes that 
human life is meaningless. Human beings are without meaning and the world is 
without meaning. Human values cannot be combined into a unified, universally 
coherent and valid system of ideas, as the history of Western philosophy has often 
presupposed, because they stem from our conflicting, animal needs; not from an 
assumed correlation between our rational ideas of ourselves and the actual nature of 
the world. 
From the incommensurability of values, the conclusion that there is no single, 
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rational ideal for human life follows: “If rational inquiry has failed to produce 
agreement on the best life, it is not because of any imperfection in human reason. It 
is because the idea of perfection has no sense in human life.”52 The idea that there 
can be one vision of “the Good, the True and the Beautiful” is false. If there are a 
myriad of values that can be regarded as acceptable, then there are, likewise, a 
myriad of “goods” towards which human beings may reasonably strive. Hence, there 
can be no single, perfect ideal for human life that is universal for all people. Humanity 
will strive for varying goods; goods which are incommensurable and which will 
inevitably produce conflict when they are combined in a single society, or even when 
they are combined in a single life. 
Not only does Gray regard the pursuit of a rationally ideal life as pointless, he 
attacks even the notion that human life has meaning at all. In Straw Dogs, in 
particular, Gray argues that anthropocentrism – regarding humanity as the most 
important feature of existence – is an error that underpins the history of (at least 
Western) philosophy: 
Philosophers from Plato to Hegel have interpreted the world as if it was a 
mirror of human thinking. Later philosophers such as Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein went further, and claimed that the world is a construction of 
human thought. In all these philosophies, the world acquires a significance 
from the fact that humans have appeared in it. In fact, until humans arrive, 
there is hardly a world at all.53 
This is the error that lies at the heart of all regimes that try to find meaning in human 
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life and history. All such systems mistakenly try to capture and enshrine the 
“essence” of human nature in a rational system of ideas. But human existence is not 
reducible to a unified system of thought. To assume that it is, is to assume a 
meaning for human existence that Gray denies and that he insists is a pervasive 
error in Western philosophical anthropology. Gray traces the foundations of this error 
back to both Greek logo-centrism and to Christian faith. 
Gray locates the source of anthropocentrism in “Realism” that, he argues, has 
its source in written language. It is in capturing the world in written language that the 
first error in Western philosophy was made. “Writing creates an artificial memory, 
whereby humans can enlarge their experience beyond the limits of one generation or 
one way of life,” writes Gray; “At the same time it has allowed them to invent a world 
of abstract entities and mistake them for reality.”54 He continues: “Plato was what 
historians of philosophy call a realist – he believed that abstract terms designated 
spiritual or intellectual entities.”55 Elsewhere, Gray describes the Enlightenment as 
“an authentic development of a central Western tradition going back to Socrates, 
and indeed beyond …in whose fragments the fundamental commitments of Greek 
logocentrism – which I understand as the conception in which human reason mirrors 
the structure of the world – are affirmed.”56  
In opposition to this error, Gray asserts a kind of Taoistic, non-rational 
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apprehension of the world. He sees hints of this in Heidegger’s later thought, in his 
concept of “Gelassenheit” (or “releasement”), “in which we let things be rather than 
aiming willfully to transform them or subject them to our purposes.” 57  The 
concluding sentences of Straw Dogs summarize his approach to the notion of 
human reason and meaning: “Other animals do not need a purpose in life. A 
contradiction to itself, the human animal cannot do without one. Can we not think of 
the aim of life as being simply to see?”58 While it is outside the scope of this 
discussion to pursue Gray’s reading of Gelassenheit and his proposal that human 
rationality should be focused on “seeing” rather than conceiving, it is clear that Gray 
believes that anthropocentric and teleological thought are entwined – 
human-centered thinking animates the belief in human destiny or meaning; and he 
believes them both to be mistaken. 
THE	  CHRISTIAN	  ROOTS	  OF	  ANTHROPOCENTRISM,	  UTOPIAN	  THINKING	  
AND	  MODERN	  POLITICAL	  VIOLENCE	  
 Gray traces utopianism and Enlightenment thinking, by way of 
anthropocentrism, back to Christian roots. Anthropocentrism is animated by 
Christian beliefs. For the Christian “everything of value in the world emanates from a 
divine person, in whose image humans are made.”59  Gray believes that once 
Christian foundations are renounced, so the notion of the value of personhood is 
baseless. He continues: “once we have relinquished Christianity the very idea of the 
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person becomes suspect.” 60  Elsewhere, Gray makes explicit the connection 
between Christianity and the Enlightenment. He writes: 
In Christian theism, value is an emanation of personality, human or divine; 
human beings have infinite worth because they partake of the divine 
personality that created them. … Denuded of its theistic framework and 
content, the idea of the human species as the source of value in the world, 
and of human relations with nature being instrumental ones in which human 
activities alone are value-creating, emerges in modern times as secular 
humanism, which from the Renaissance onwards is a defining element in the 
modern world-view. It is integral to the humanist conception of humankind 
and of its relations with nature, as this figures in the Enlightenment project 
and in its predecessor Christian world-view. …Indeed one of my central 
arguments is that modern Enlightenment humanism is continuous with and in 
large measure a modification of Christian humanist conceptions of 
humankind and the world.61 
This idea stands at the centre of Gray’s thesis in Black Mass and is central for much 
of his thought. In his view, anthropocentrism is an error in thinking that is based on 
theistic ideas. Once theistic ideas have been renounced, anthropocentrism is no 
longer valid. 
Gray also posits the Christian hopes of salvation and “world renewal” as the 
foundation of modern utopian thought. Christianity, in Gray’s account of it, has 
always had inherent in it the idea of progress: “A belief in moral progress has always 
been part of Christianity, but it remained dormant until the Reformation. Puritans 
served as a vehicle for the idea – often called post-millennialism – that human effort 
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could hasten the arrival of a perfect new world.”62 Christians believe that God will 
one day renew the heavens and the earth, bringing a perfect world into being. It is 
this idea that Gray sees as being adopted by Enlightenment thinkers and which 
inspires their dreams of utopia. Gray writes: “As we understand it today, utopianism 
began to develop along with the retreat of Christian belief. Yet the utopian faith in a 
condition of future harmony is a Christian inheritance, and so is the modern idea of 
progress.”63 Utopian ideals and the belief in progress are merely secular forms of 
the Christian hope of salvation.  
In particular, Gray sees Christian millenarian belief as the source of modern 
utopian thinking. Gray asserts: “Christian millenarians believe that Jesus will return 
to the Earth and rule over it in a new kingdom for a thousand years,”64 and hence, 
“millenarians hold to an apocalyptic view of history.”65 By “apocalyptic”, Christians 
refer to the unveiling of God’s plans for the world, “and for the Elect this means not 
catastrophe but salvation. …Jesus and his first disciples believed that the world was 
destined for imminent destruction so that a new and perfect one could come into 
being.” 66  An analysis of the accuracy of Gray’s characterization of Christian 
eschatological belief will be made in the following chapter. But it is clear that Gray 
considers Christianity to be the source of the idea of a purpose or destiny for human 
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history.  
The teleological view of human history is a Christian inheritance. Christian 
millenarianism is teleological. It believes that there is a telos or “end” for human 
history. Gray attributes modern teleological belief to the adoption of an essentially 
Christian view of history. Gray Writes: “Christianity injected the belief that human 
history is a teleological process.”67 On this point it is worth quoting Gray at length: 
In thinking of history in teleological terms, Christians believed it had an end in 
both senses: history had a pre-determined purpose, and when that was 
achieved it would come to a close. Secular thinkers such as Marx and 
Fukuyama inherited this teleology, which underpins their talk of ‘the end of 
history’. In that they view history as a movement, not necessarily inevitable 
but in the direction of a universal goal, theories of progress also rely on a 
teleological view. Standing behind all these conceptions is the belief that 
history must be understood not in terms of the causes of events but in terms 
of its purpose, which is the salvation of humanity. This idea entered western 
thought only with Christianity, and has shaped it ever since.68 
Here, Gray unites several strands of his thinking; he combines anthropocentrism and 
a teleological view of history with universal values. For Gray, the vision of a universal, 
human meaning to history is a fundamental error, founded in Christianity, which, in 
secular form, has birthed the Enlightenment and the modern belief in progress.  
Gray’s understanding of Christianity, drawing on the work of scholars such as 
Albert Schweitzer and Norman Cohn, posits eschatological hope as a central, yet 
contested theme in the history of Christian thought.  Gray describes Jesus’ 
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teachings as “eschatological” and as “grounded in the belief that humanity was in its 
final days.”69 Gray claims that Jesus’ “radically dualistic view of the world” was at 
odds with biblical Judaism,70 and that he “belonged in a heterodox current of 
mainstream Judaism.”71 Jesus came announcing the imminent arrival of the end of 
the current world and the establishment of a new world that is “without corruption.”72 
However, the “new kingdom did not arrive, and Jesus was arrested and executed by 
the Romans. The history of Christianity is a series of attempts to cope with this 
founding experience of eschatological disappointment.”73 Consequently a belief in 
Jesus’ resurrection “sprang up” amongst his followers; a belief that was soon after 
interpreted as “a metaphor for an inner change.”74 The apostle Paul was the one 
who universalized the ideas of this marginal Jewish sect and established a “universal 
religion.”75 Augustine, influenced by Platonism, further transformed Jesus’ message 
into an allegory for spiritual change. Gray writes: “By de-literalizing the hope of the 
End, Augustine preserved eschatology while reducing its risks. The kingdom of God 
existed in a realm out of time, and the inner transformation it symbolized could be 
realized at any point in history.”76 Gray concludes his discussion of Christian origins 
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by declaring that “Christianity injected eschatology into the heart of Western 
civilization, and despite Augustine it has reappeared time and again.”77 While a more 
in-depth analysis of the role of eschatology in Christian thinking will be made later, it 
is worth noting that Gray’s reading of Christian theology is largely a marginal one.  
UTOPIA	  AND	  VIOLENCE	  
Gray argues that utopian projects are not merely unachievable, but ultimately 
violent. He cites examples of modern utopian projects, built on the “Enlightenment 
faith” in progress, which turned to violence as a means of achieving their ends. He 
includes Nazism, Communist Russia and (controversially) radical Islam, as examples 
of twentieth-century political projects that aim to create an ideal world and that turn 
to violent means to bring this world into being. They are all used to illustrate his point 
that: “The use of inhumane methods to achieve impossible ends is the essence of 
revolutionary utopianism.”78 If ultimate human salvation is possible in the future, 
then so valuable an end mitigates sacrifice and violence as present means.  
Gray locates the source of modern political terror in the roots of the French 
Revolution. He argues that terror first came to be seen as “an instrument for 
perfecting humanity”79 by the Jacobins, an eighteenth-century group that influenced 
the French Revolution. Driven by the belief that society had become corrupt because 
of repression and that it could be transformed by force, the Jacobins used terror as 
“a technique of civic education and an instrument of social engineering … A higher 
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form of human life was within reach – even a higher type of human being – but only 
once humanity had been purified by violence.”80 One of the central fallacies held by 
those who use terror for political means in modern times is the idea that human 
nature can be altered. Gray asserts that those who engage in terror for political 
purposes do so in the belief that they will be able to bring about a change in human 
nature by their actions.  
It is this same idea, inspired by Enlightenment ideals of a telos for humanity, 
and coupled with modern faith in science and progress – that human nature can be 
transformed into its perfect form – that underpinned the catastrophic violence of 
twentieth-century politics. “At its worst,” writes Gray, “twentieth-century terror was 
used with the aim of transforming human life. The peculiar quality of 
twentieth-century terror is not its scale. … It is that its goal was to perfect human 
life.”81 Gray illustrates this using the example of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. 
He identifies the belief that human nature can somehow be transformed in the 
writing of Trotsky. Gray writes: “In Trotsky’s view history is the process in which 
humanity gains control of itself and the world. … Trotsky’s vision in which science is 
used to perfect humanity expresses a recurrent modern fantasy. …From the start the 
Bolsheviks aimed to create a new type of human being.”82 Gray sees this modern 
line of thinking running through all utopian regimes that seek to transform societies 
and ultimately human nature itself, into a more perfect form, through the use of terror 
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and violence. With the Jacobins, Gray remarks “The era of political mass murder had 
arrived.”83 Violence as a political tool began with the Jacobins and has persisted in 
modern politics. Gray lists Mao, Pol Pot and radical Islamic movements as just some 
of the many political groups who have similarly embraced violence as a liberating 
power in the twentieth-century.84 
The turn to violence hinged on the abandonment of the Christian faith that 
God would bring about salvation for humanity. It was the shift from belief in divine 
intervention that would create the perfect world, to human intervention and the use 
of violence as the means of bringing about the perfect human society that has 
marked twentieth-century politics and opened the door to the terror and unparalleled 
political violence of recent history. With the decline of Christian beliefs, what Gray 
terms “modern secular religion” rose and with it the kind of revolutionary utopianism 
that did not shrink from the use of violence to reshape the world.85 Gray identifies 
the source of political violence as resulting from the secularization of Christian hopes 
for salvation. This is the crux of his argument:  
If Christianity sparked a hope of world-renewal that had not existed in the 
ancient world it also spawned a new type of violence. The Christian promise 
of universal salvation was inherited by its secular successors. But whereas in 
Christianity salvation was promised only in the life hereafter, modern political 
religions offer the prospect of salvation in the future – even, disastrously, the 
near future. In a seeming paradox, modern revolutionary movements renew 
the apocalyptic myths of early Christianity. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	   Ibid.,	  38.	  
84	   Ibid.,	  37.	  
85	   Ibid.,	  39.	  
	   55	  
With the Jacobins, that utopianism became a revolutionary movement and 
modern secular religion a political force. Post-millennialist Christians 
propagated beliefs that mutated into the secular faith in progress; but so 
long as history was believed to be governed by providence there was no 
attempt to direct it by violence. While Christianity was unchallenged, Utopia 
was a dream pursued by marginal cults. The decline of Christianity and the 
rise of revolutionary utopianism go together. When Christianity was rejected, 
its eschatological hopes did not disappear. They were repressed, only to 
return as projects of universal emancipation.86 
Christianity gave the world hope for salvation. But when those hopes were divorced 
from a divine agency to achieve them, they fuelled political violence and terror, 
which were deployed in the service of the creation of a perfect world. 
Utopian political thinking and its inherent violence have in recent years 
entered the mainstream, manifested most clearly in the politics of the United States. 
The utopian ideal for the United States, and indeed for much of the Western world, is 
“American-style democratic capitalism.”87 Western governments have followed the 
United States in a mission to install democracy throughout the world. Gray 
condemns this move as “an impossible dream that in many countries could only 
produce chaos.”88  Coupled with the “war on terror”, this kind of politics has 
repeated the pattern of other utopian political endeavours of the twentieth-century – 
it has become violent. Gray outlines the ways in which this has been manifested: 
[The United States] was prepared to engage in pre-emptive attacks on 
sovereign states in order to achieve its goals, while at the same time it has 
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been ready to erode long-established American freedoms. It has established 
a concentration camp in Guantanamo whose inmates are beyond the reach 
of normal legal protection, denied the protection of habeas corpus to terrorist 
suspects, set up an apparatus of surveillance to monitor the population and 
authorized American officials to practice what in any other country would be 
defined as torture.89 
The most recent and dramatic example of this “impossible dream” of installing 
democracy throughout the world has been the war in Iraq. The United States and its 
allies have attempted to install a Western-style democracy in Iraq; a project that 
Gray describes as “unrealizable.”90 In fact, Gray describes the outcome as an 
“American defeat in Iraq.”91  He writes: “The perception fostered by the Bush 
Administration that Iraq has a fledgling government that is rebuilding the country has 
no basis in reality…. The Iraqi state has disappeared into history’s memory hole.”92  
CHRISTIANITY	  AS	  UBIQUITOUS	  ILLUSION	  
The re-emergence of repressed Christian hopes is another central idea for 
Gray. Religion is an illusion, but it is a necessary illusion in that it answers to 
universal human needs. “Religions have served many purposes,” writes Gray, “but at 
bottom they answer to a need for meaning that is met by myth rather than by 
explanation. A great deal of modern thought consists of secular myths – hollowed 
out religious narratives translated into pseudo-science.”93  
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The myth that Gray most readily identifies as a “hollowed out religious 
narrative” is that of human meaning in history. Gray writes: “Humans cannot live 
without illusion. For the men and women of today, an irrational faith in progress may 
be the only antidote to nihilism.”94 But this need for meaning is one that Gray 
regards as a universal human need that, while it may be an illusion, is not one that 
can be eradicated. Gray believes that this is something that early secular thinkers 
understood. He writes: 
Marx held to a reductive view in which religion was a by-product of 
oppression; but he was clear it expressed the deepest human aspirations – it 
was not only the opiate of the masses but also ‘the heart of a heartless 
world’. The French Positivists wanted to replace Christianity by a ridiculous 
Religion of Humanity; but they understood that religion answered to universal 
human needs. Only a very credulous philosopher could believe that showing 
religion is an illusion will make it disappear.95 
For Gray, even though religion is an illusion, it is not one that will go away. Human 
beings have a universal, irrational need for meaning. Religion answers to that need. 
When religion is repressed, the desire for meaning re-emerges in other forms. 
“Religion has not gone away,” writes Gray. “Repressing it is like repressing sex, a 
self-defeating enterprise … To attempt to eradicate religion … only leads to it 
reappearing in grotesque and degraded forms.” 96  And Gray believes modern 
instantiations of the need for meaning have begotten these “degraded forms”; 
whether Nazism, Communism, fundamentalist Islam or what Gray calls American 
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“armed missionaries,”97 forms of “salvation” which have jettisoned the place of God 
all turn to human devices, and ultimately to terror and violence to achieve their aims. 
Gray describes utopian political regimes as “political religions” and as secular 
successors to Christian faith. Inasmuch as they inhabit and propagate the old myths 
of human destiny and a utopian salvation for mankind, they are examples of the 
re-emergence of the myths that were formerly advanced by religion. It is in 
understanding modern politics in this way which leads Gray to open Black Mass with 
the provocative statement that: “Modern politics is a chapter in the history of 
religion.”98 Gray continues: 
The greatest of the revolutionary upheavals that have shaped so much of the 
history of the past two centuries were episodes in the history of faith – 
moments in the long dissolution of Christianity and the rise of modern 
political religion. The world in which we find ourselves at the start of the new 
millennium is littered with the debris of utopian projects, which though they 
were framed in secular terms that denied the truth of religion were in fact 
vehicles for religious myths.99 
 
Secularism has not thrown off the myths that are inherent in Christian faith; 
rather, it has propagated them in mutated forms that have engendered violence and 
terror. Writing of the regimes of Mao and Stalin, Gray asserts: “They were 
demonstrating what happens when atheism becomes a political project. The 
invariable result is an ersatz religion that can only be maintained by tyrannical 
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means.”100 In the failure of these political religions Gray sees the genesis of a 
renewal of faith as a force in the political realm. In particular, he sees the American 
defeat (as he describes it) in Iraq as the last gasp of secular political religion, opening 
the door for the myths of salvation and human meaning to once again be animated 
by faith, rather than by the faith in science and progress that has largely lost 
credibility. Gray writes: 
When the project of universal democracy ended in the blood-soaked streets 
of Iraq, this pattern [of belief in secular utopias] began to be reversed. 
Utopianism suffered a heavy blow, but politics and war have not ceased to 
be vehicles for myth. Instead, primitive versions of religion are replacing the 
secular faith that has been lost. Apocalyptic religion shapes the policies of 
American president George W. Bush and his antagonist Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad in Iran. Wherever it is happening, the revival of religion is mixed 
up with political conflicts, including an intensifying struggle over the Earth’s 
shrinking reserves of natural resources; but there can be no doubt that 
religion is once again a power in its own right. With the death of Utopia, 
apocalyptic religion has re-emerged, naked and unadorned, as a force in 
world politics.101 
Elsewhere, Gray asserts: “The mass political movements of the twentieth century 
were vehicles for myths inherited from religion, and it is no accident that religion is 
reviving now that these movements have collapsed.” 102  The myth of human 
meaning, while an illusion, is ineradicable. When the ideology that sustains it 
becomes implausible it is resurrected in another form and continues to shape human 
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politics and self-understanding. As such, this illusion is intrinsic to human nature; as 
Gray himself insists, we cannot live without it.  
Gray concludes that we must learn to live with this myth, this illusion. If its 
denial only results in its re-emergence in degraded form, then the only option is to 
embrace it. Consequently, he concludes Black Mass by opining: “The most 
necessary task of the present time is to accept the irreducible reality of religion … 
religions express human needs that no change in society can remove – for example 
the need to accept what cannot be remedied and find meaning in the chances of life. 
Human beings will no more cease to be religious than they will stop being sexual, 
playful or violent.”103  
For Gray, the ubiquity of religious myths is a constant which must be 
harnessed for its potential in helping us deal with the contingencies and conflicts of 
our existence, since “at its best religion has been an attempt to deal with the mystery 
rather than the hope that mystery will be unveiled.”104 In the latter part of this thesis, 
the power of Christian ‘myth’ to make sense of our pluralist existence in a 
non-violent way will be explored as a counter-proposal to Gray’s bleak 
prognostication that  “the violence of faith looks set to shape the coming 
century.”105 
MODUS	  VIVENDI	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Gray’s constructive proposal for politics is that it must take the form of a 
modus vivendi; a political regime that aims to resolve conflicts between differing and 
diverse groups without privileging a particular view of the good, or any one set of 
values. Gray describes a modus vivendi as the kind of political project that best 
represents the liberal ideal of toleration, without seeking an “ultimate convergence 
on values.”106 He writes: 
Liberalism contains two philosophies. In one, toleration is justified as a 
means to truth. In this view, toleration is an instrument of rational consensus, 
and a diversity of ways of life is endured in the faith that it is destined to 
disappear. In the other, toleration is valued as a condition of peace, and 
divergent ways of living are welcomed as marks of diversity in the good life. 
The first conception supports an ideal of ultimate convergence on values, the 
latter an ideal of modus vivendi. Liberalism’s future lies in turning its face 
away from the ideal of rational consensus and looking instead to modus 
vivendi.107 
Modus vivendi is, for Gray, the only conceivable political project that does not 
privilege a particular set of values as the ideal for society or as the telos of which 
every form of society is an approximation. Rather, in making toleration and peaceful 
coexistence its goal, modus vivendi allows various views of the good life to coexist 
without requiring conformity to any one view.  
Gray recognizes that a consequence of his values pluralism is the admission 
that not all legitimate regimes need be liberal. That is, there are many forms of “the 
good life” that can be protected and embodied by political regimes that do not hold 
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to traditionally liberal values. “There are minimal standards of decency and 
legitimacy that apply to all contemporary regimes,” writes Gray, “but they are not 
liberal values writ large…. A regime can be highly legitimate without honouring 
values that are distinctly liberal.”108 From as early on as his book Liberalisms, written 
in 1989, Gray has asserted: “If we abandon the delusive perspective of universality 
… we can see liberal society as a historical achievement, an inheritance of 
institutions and traditions which informs our thought and practice in profound ways, 
but which we are bound to acknowledge has no universally apodictic character.”109 
However, this does not lead Gray to conclude that we abandon Liberalism. Rather, it 
can be embraced as our historical inheritance, but not as our universal destiny. 
There is nothing to suppose that liberal democracy is the final form of human 
flourishing. Rather it is the product of our modern times. Gray writes: “To deny the 
historical reality of liberal individuality is then absurd, but to turn it into a universal 
theory – or, after the fashion of the Enlightenment, to appoint it the telos of history – 
is to traffic in illusions.”110 Gray’s suggestion of a politically legitimate regime is one 
that embraces the historically bound polities that exist, without privileging or 
enshrining any of them as an ideology. 
Gray’s suggestion for a modus vivendi is one of limited government with the 
promotion of peaceful coexistence as its primary function. “The implication of this 
perspective for the character of the modern state,” writes Gray, of his proposal for a 
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  Liberalisms,	  240.	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   Gray,	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modus vivendi, “is that … modern government must be limited government. … The 
liberty that is preserved is that of the liberal individual, but it is a liberty that thereby 
guarantees cultural freedom – the condition in which individuals may opt to explore 
an inherited form of life, or migrate across traditions to a chosen lifestyle, if they so 
wish.”111 The embracing of cultural diversity is a primary value for this form of 
government. But its highest value or animating telos is peaceful co-existence. The 
establishing of this point is of central importance to any analysis of Gray’s theory. 
Given his rejection of the possibility of a legitimate telos for human life and society, it 
is important to consider his argument for peaceful coexistence as the highest value 
of his political proposal: 
The case for modus vivendi is not that it is some kind of transcendent value 
which all ways of life are bound to honour. It is that all or nearly all ways of life 
have interests that make peaceful coexistence worth pursuing. Peaceful 
coexistence is worth pursuing only insofar as it advances human interests. 
Like any political ideal, it is a contingent good.  
…. 
Because they are practised by human beings, all ways of life have some 
interests in common. As we know, it is frequently those interests that divide 
us. At the same time they give us reason to pursue coexistence.112 
While these statements are sufficiently vague as to resist categorical definition, they 
indicate that Gray posits the existence of a common human interest that suggests 
peaceful coexistence to be a universal good. While a thorough analysis of the logic 
and consistency of Gray’s position will be undertaken in the following chapter, it is 
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enough to note here that his proposal of a modus vivendi privileges the value of 
peaceful coexistence among a diversity of cultures, and that it does this at the 
expense of other values (such as liberal values) that would make claims to 
universality - claims that Gray denies to all values.  
Again, in Black Mass, Gray writes of his political proposal, referring 
specifically to the persistence of diverse religious beliefs:  
It embodies a type of tolerance whose goal is not truth but peace. When the 
goal of tolerance is truth it is a strategy that aims for harmony. It would be 
better to accept that harmony will never be reached. Better yet, give up the 
demand for harmony and welcome the varieties of human experience. The 
modus vivendi between religions that has flourished intermittently in the past 
might then be renewed.113  
Here, it seems, Gray privileges peace over truth.  If this turns out to be an accurate 
analysis, then Gray’s modus vivendi may have just as little, and as much, of a 
reasonable foundation as liberal values, anthropocentrism and the belief in a telos, or 
ultimate good for human life. 
SUMMARY	  
In Black Mass, John Gray argues that modern politics is utopian; it seeks the 
creation of an ideal world. This utopianism is unrealizable because of the essential 
conflictual nature of the human needs, which constitute our human nature. 
Furthermore, the truth that there is a plurality of values, many of which are 
incommensurable - that is, they cannot be combined, ranked or rationally chosen 
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between in many situations – indicates that human life cannot be oriented to a 
particular telos which is rationally constructed and toward which all human societies 
converge. This idea undermines the possibility of a valid teleology and thus 
undermines all utopian projects, since they all seek the telos of a perfect society. 
Gray argues that Christian theology is the source of modern teleology. 
Secular political philosophy has embraced the notion of a future salvation for 
humankind, albeit a political one, rather than a divine one. Further, Christianity is also 
the source of anthropocentricism since it gives ultimate value to persons, as made in 
the image of God. The combination of anthropocentric thinking and teleology has 
continued to sustain human belief in the meaningfulness of human life, even in 
secular society. While the meaningfulness of life is an illusion, it is not one that 
human beings can live without, for it re-emerges in other forms wherever it is 
repressed. Hence secular humanism has revived the Christian belief in an ideal telos 
for human life.  
Once it became divorced from a reliance on divine providence, utopian 
thinking became violent, using terror and violence to bring about the ideal social 
conditions it sought. The violence of utopianism is underpinned by the illusion that 
human nature can be transformed through the use of terror, and that the current 
imperfections of any society are the consequence of flawed systems, rather than an 
imperfection in human nature itself.  
Finally, Gray proposes modus vivendi as a plausible political regime in a 
pluralist culture. Government should not aim to promote or uphold a particular view 
of the good, since the good is many and diverse. Rather, it should seek to facilitate 
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the peaceful coexistence of diverse groups, providing a forum for political 
negotiation, rather than the universalization of rights and ways of life that are 
particular and historically contingent. 
  
CHAPTER	  3:	  GRAY’S	  ANATOMY	  
A	  CRITIQUE	  OF	  JOHN	  GRAY’S	  THESIS	  
John Gray’s critique of Enlightenment thinking and his proposal of a modus 
vivendi are beset by logical inconsistencies. Gray rejects a very specific and rare 
form of teleology and supposes that he has thereby defeated every form of it. This is 
largely due to his limited notion of what a telos must entail. This creates difficulty for 
Gray’s argument by virtue of the fact that his own proposal relies on a species of 
teleology. In order for Gray’s rejection of teleology to remain consistent, he would 
have to embrace the nihilism that lingers behind his thought and surrender all hope 
of making any constructive proposals for politics. His refusal to do so reveals his 
own “faith” in the nature of human life as irresolvably conflictual. This faith (his values 
pluralism) is at odds with his modus vivendi – a political system that could not exist 
without dissolving the very conditions that necessitate it. These issues render Gray’s 
argument logically incoherent, for it is yet another faith in a marketplace of faiths, 
albeit a faith which offers little to human existence. Gray’s analysis of eschatology 
and violence is likewise rendered ineffectual by the inaccurate location of “violence” 
in the heart of Christian eschatology. Rather, secularism is, like other systems of 
thought, a rival faith to Christianity, and one that, by virtue of its susceptibility to 
nationalistic and mundane goals, embraces and perpetuates violence. Despite his 
attempts to disabuse us of our Christian “illusions”, Gray’s own thought is unable to 
define itself apart from those horizons of peace and human flourishing that 
Christianity bequeathed to the Western world. 
In the prologue to his third edition of After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre outlines a 
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way of critiquing a rival tradition in a way that overcomes the lack of shared 
presuppositions that often renders inter-tradition critiques ineffectual. In MacIntyre’s 
proposal, a rival tradition must be critiqued internally; that is, the tradition’s 
irrationalities and contradictions must be exposed on its own terms. If one’s own 
tradition is able to reconcile or adequately explain these difficulties, it thereby 
demonstrates its superiority to that first tradition. MacIntyre explicates the method 
for someone wanting to critique a rival tradition as follows: 
A necessary first step would be for them to come to understand what it is to 
think in terms prescribed by that particular rival tradition, to learn how to 
think as if one were a convinced adherent of that rival tradition. … A second 
step is to identify, from the standpoint of the adherents of that rival tradition, 
its crucially important unresolved issues and unsolved problems – 
unresolved and unsolved by the standards of that tradition – which now 
confront those adherents and to enquire how progress might be made in 
moving towards their resolution and solution… 
When the adherents of a tradition are able through such acts of imagination 
and questioning to interrogate some particular rival tradition, it is always 
possible that they may be able to conclude, indeed that they may be 
compelled to conclude, that it is only from the standpoint of their own 
tradition that the difficulties of that rival tradition can be adequately 
understood and overcome. It is only if the central theses of their own 
tradition are true and its arguments sound, that this rival tradition can be 
expected to encounter just those difficulties that it has encountered and that 
its lack of conceptual, normative, and other resources to deal with these 
difficulties can be explained. So it is possible for one such tradition to defeat 
another in respect of the adequacy of its claims to truth and to rational 
justification, even though there are no neutral standards available by appeal 
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to which any rational agent whatsoever could determine which tradition is 
superior to which.1 
It is this kind of critique I wish to level at Gray’s argument. While it does not 
represent a “tradition” as such, his argument still has inconsistencies and internal 
contradictions that can be resolved more adequately by reference to theological 
positions. While I will make a more thorough theological proposal in a later chapter, 
theological concepts will be developed and employed in this critique to the degree 
that they are able to resolve those contradictions and difficulties most central to 
Gray’s proposal.  
Gray himself endorses this kind of internal or “immanent critique” in his 
approach to the liberal tradition. He notes that once the pursuit of normative 
universal values is abandoned (as it is in Gray’s theory), a tradition or theory can only 
be rationally evaluated and reformed according to the values of that self-same 
tradition or theory. Gray writes: 
Once the fundamental liberal project of achieving an Archimedean point of 
leverage on practice is abandoned, theorizing can turn to the institutions, 
conventions and traditions that comprise the practice of liberty. Criticism and 
reform of existing civil societies may then proceed, but it will be immanent 
criticism, internal to the life of each specific civil society, which does not 
pretend to be governed by any abstract conception of freedom.2 
In order to critique Gray’s argument, a similar approach will be taken, by which his 
positions will be critiqued from within. The points of interest, then, will be those 
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   Alasdair	  MacIntyre,	  After	  Virtue,	  Third	  Edition.	  (Notre	  Dame,	  Indiana:	  University	  of	  Notre	  Dame	  
Press,	  2007),	  xiii.	  
2	   Gray,	  Post-­‐Liberalism,	  318.	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points of inconsistency and unresolved conflict. Of course, this kind of critique can 
only be mounted on the assumptions and “foundations” of Gray’s argument. A 
separate line of “external” critique will challenge the validity of these assumptions. 
AN IMMANENT CRITIQUE OF GRAY’S THESIS 
GRAY’S	  TELEOLOGICAL	  “STRAW	  MAN”	  
Gray rejects universal meaning in favour of particularity. Despite his 
affirmation of “universal human needs,”3 Gray’s account of values pluralism (and the 
philosophical anthropology that underpins it), locates the source of human values in 
their social contexts or ways of life. While he accepts that there are universal values, 
Gray rejects their universalizability across contexts on the grounds that there may be 
many different ways for these values to be applied, not just one: “If rational inquiry 
has failed to produce agreement on the best life, it is not because of any 
imperfection in human reason. It is because the idea of perfection has no sense in 
human life.”4 The subtlety of this point must not be missed: universal values cannot 
be normative for Gray. They are universal in the sense they are shared by all, but 
they cannot then constitute a singular, universal morality, due to their conflicting and 
incommensurable nature.  
On the basis of this account of values-pluralism, Gray rejects teleology and 
the meaning of human history.5 He writes: “On the pluralist view, human history as a 
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5	   “Telos”	  is	  a	  Greek	  word	  with	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  Literally,	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whole has, and can have, no meaning; it is at best, a series of adventures in 
civilization, each singular and discrete, leading nowhere, and at no point disclosing 
or approximating the features of ‘man qua man’.”6 In Gray’s theory, if there are many 
views of the good life, there can be no way to judge human history’s progress in 
terms of its approximation to the good, since for Gray, as has been noted in the 
previous chapter, only one combination of values, normative for all, can be 
considered a telos. 
Gray’s conclusion as to the meaninglessness of human history is a false 
dichotomy. His argument proceeds as follows: (A) For human history to have 
meaning it must have a single, definable telos; (B) Values pluralism demonstrates 
that there is not a single telos for human life; therefore, (C) Human history has no 
meaning. However, it is not clear that (A) is necessarily true. Need human history be 
rationally inevaluable because there is a plurality of human goods? There is no 
reason why this should be true. Gray himself acknowledges that there are universal 
values which can form a “moral minimum” by which regimes can be judged to be 
more or less legitimate: “no regime can truly claim to embody the best settlement of 
conflicts among universal values.”7 But they can still claim to be good ones; they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
object”	  (Oxford	  Dictionary).	  While	  the	  two	  connotations	  are	  related,	  they	  are	  not	  identical.	  Gray	  
rejects	  both	  kinds.	  He	  rejects	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  “end	  of	  history”;	  there	  is,	  for	  him,	  no	  ultimate	  political	  
system	  toward	  which	  all	  other	  political	  systems	  are	  heading.	  However,	  he	  also	  rejects	  the	  notion	  of	  
an	  “ideal”	  as	  well.	  For	  Gray,	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  perfect	  combination	  of	  values	  is	  rendered	  meaningless	  
by	  the	  incommensurabilities	  of	  values	  pluralism.	  There	  is	  no	  telos	  of	  either	  a	  historical	  or	  theoretical	  
kind.	  (Black	  Mass,	  6.)	  
6	   Gray,	  Post-­‐Liberalism,	  292.	  
7	   Gray,	  Two	  Faces	  of	  Liberalism,	  67.	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can claim that they are within that group of legitimate regimes that avoids all, or as 
many as possible of, the generically human evils Gray acknowledges.8 Glen Newey 
makes this point: 
Surely the requirement to avoid these [universal] evils could itself form the 
basis of such a [minimum] morality, even if there is no universally valid means 
of choosing between evils? After all, many Kantians argue that reason can 
generate a universal minimum morality, even if its application remains 
circumstantially variable.9 
 
The teleological view of history that Gray rejects is a “straw man”. The key to 
Gray’s logical error is made clear in the details of his argument, in Post-Liberalism, 
where he writes: 
True, there may be improvement within any particular culture, as judged by 
its own standards; and there may, as limiting cases, be a few instances, in 
which we can judge that, granted all relevant incommensurabilities, there has 
been a betterment or a worsening in goods and evils that are not 
culture-specific, but generically human. This latter limiting case gives no 
support, however, to the whiggish conception of history as a narrative of 
progress, as a moral drama with ourselves as its telos, which is one of the 
many illegitimate offspring of Judaeo-Christianity that inform the sentimental 
and absurd religion of humanity which is the secular faith of the Western 
intelligentsia. On the pluralist view, human history as a whole has, and can 
have, no meaning.10 
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Given the complexity of his sentences, it may be helpful to isolate the specific claims 
made here by Gray. The first (made just before this excerpt, and at its conclusion), is 
that human history has no meaning, no sense of progressing or improving. However, 
just after admitting that there are examples of “a betterment or a worsening in goods 
and evils that are not culture-specific, but generically human,” Gray then goes on to 
assert, despite the fact that such an admission supports the notion of “progress” in 
general, that this “gives no support” to “the whiggish conception of history as a 
narrative of progress, as a moral drama with ourselves as its telos” – which is a 
definition of the idea of meaning in human history in narrow and easily contestable 
terms. Gray then concludes, as if this has demonstrated his point clearly, that 
“human history…can have no meaning.” Even forgetting the fact that Gray is making 
an argument from absence (also a false dichotomy), he is attacking a straw man. 
Certainly there are some who regard our current civilisation as the highest 
achievement of history, like Fukuyama, whom Gray dismisses;11 but many who 
adhere to a progressive or Enlightenment view of history, would merely assert that 
what we have now is better than much of what has preceded, without wanting to 
claim that we are at history’s end or goal. This is one example of the false either/or 
dichotomies that Gray’s argument stands or falls on. Marcus Roberts, in his 
response to Enlightenment’s Wake, makes the same point: 
[T]he abandonment of "the Enlightenment conception of the historical 
progress of the species" does not follow from value incommensurability - 
unless all that is meant by "the Enlightenment conception" is crude 
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teleologism combined with utopian visions of an absolutely marvellous 
society, successfully reconciling, once and forever, all good things. But in 
that case it is one to which few of those Gray is attacking are committed.12 
Likewise, Gregory Johnson contends: “the most plausible construal of Gray's 
position makes his opponent look like a straw man.”13 There is no reason why 
history cannot be viewed as potentially progressive, and actually so in many cases. If 
there are universal goods and evils, as Gray accepts, then any regime may be 
assessed by reference to these.  While Gray is correct in saying there is no one best 
way to combine these often incommensurable, universal values – which Gray 
construes as evidence of the “abundance of good lives that human beings can live”14 
– he is wrong to say that this then means no objective judgements can be made. 
Only regarding the one best system of government can there be no judgement 
made. The judgement that governments are better or worse is not excluded by such 
a conclusion. Rather, what Gray rejects is an ontology where “truth” is singular. 
Inherent in Gray’s argument, then, is the fundamental tension in philosophy 
between the One and the Many. Gray rejects the universalising of the One at the 
expense of the Many, yet his proposal (as any political proposal must be) is an 
attempt to make the Many, One, without it being dissolved into sameness. In his 
discussion of the pre-Socratic philosopher Thales, Frederick Copleston identifies the 
genesis of the philosophical idea of “the One and the Many”: 
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[Thales] earns his place as the First Greek philosopher from the fact that he 
first conceives the notion of Unity in Difference … and, while holding fast to 
the idea of unity, endeavours to account for the evident diversity of the many. 
Philosophy naturally tries to understand the plurality that we experience, its 
existence and nature, and to understand in this connection means, for the 
philosopher, to discover an underlying unity or first principle.15 
Gray is not therefore discovering some new fact about the world in his presentation 
of values pluralism and modus vivendi. Rather, his is an attempt at re-solving a 
tension inherent in the way that humanity has apprehended reality from the earliest 
times. In a prescient statement (given Gray’s own treatment of this problem), 
indicating his own Thomist loyalties, Copleston suggests the kind of thought which 
best resolves this paradox, and the likely outcome when these ideas are not present: 
Justice can be done to the complexity of the problem of the One and the 
Many only if the essential degrees of reality and the doctrine of the analogy 
of being are clearly understood and unambiguously maintained: otherwise 
the richness of the manifold will be sacrificed to a false and more or less 
arbitrarily conceived unity.16 
It is against just this kind of “arbitrarily conceived unity” that Gray sustains his 
critique of Liberalism and the Enlightenment project. It is a strength of Gray’s that he 
discerns a weakness in Liberalism’s resolution of this perennial tension. However, 
his own unifying proposal is “more or less arbitrarily conceived” in that it is founded 
on relatively unexamined and relatively unjustified presuppositions, as will be 
demonstrated below. It is important to note, however, that it is not the fact of having 
presuppositions for which I criticize Gray; rather, it is their unexamined and poorly 
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  Books,	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justified nature. Their “unexamined” nature becomes clear when it can be 
demonstrated how they are inconsistent with the rest of his thought. 
THE	  INHERENT	  TELEOLOGY	  IN	  GRAY’S	  MODUS	  VIVENDI	  
Gray undermines the claim that human history is without meaning when he 
suggests a modus vivendi as a “better” regime than others. As has been noted, the 
idea of meaning requires a goal or telos that human life can be judged as being 
either closer to or further away from; hence meaning requires the possibility of 
“progress” which Gray rejects. He insists that “value-pluralism as a theory of ethics 
points towards modus vivendi as a political ideal.”17 If all regimes are judged as 
“leading nowhere, and at no point disclosing or approximating the features of ‘man 
qua man’”18, then how can modus vivendi be an ideal? In Gray’s view, it is an ideal 
because it more accurately approximates the features of the indeterminacy of human 
nature; the fact of values-pluralism is better represented by modus vivendi, 
according to Gray’s argument. Surely, then, this is an example of that “‘general, 
progressive amelioration of the world’” that Gray regards as “‘a fiction’”.19 If Gray 
suggests that modus vivendi should replace Liberalism, the implicit rationale is that it 
is because it is an improvement; in some objective way it is better than Liberalism. 
Again, Newey is insightful in indicating the subtlety in this truth: 
What is up for grabs in politics is, for the pessimist [such as Gray], the 
sub-ideal as opposed to something still worse. Hence it is the prime role of 
politics to secure what is securable – which, compared with some worse 
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outcomes, may be quite a lot. The best may be the enemy of the good, as 
the saying goes, but the bearably bad can also be made the enemy of the 
worst.20 
If this is not progress, then it is not so only in terms of Gray’s narrow definition 
whereby the “best” is identical to the perfect or ideal. Progress can be of this more 
modest species, and it is this kind of progress that Gray’s own proposal admits. 
What is problematic for Gray’s argument is that his rejection of teleology is 
inconsistent. Not only does Gray fail to see the potential for the coexistence of a 
telos and a plurality of ways of life, he also fails to see the telos in his own proposal 
of a modus vivendi. As Crowder has demonstrated, it “amounts precisely to the kind 
of universal privileging of a particular notion of the good that he attributes to liberal 
universalists.”21 His proposal of a modus vivendi privileges the value of toleration 
and its concomitant telos of peaceful coexistence. Horton defends Gray’s account 
of modus vivendi against this charge, highlighting that Gray “need not claim that 
modus vivendi is the supreme good; only that if people want to live together in a civil 
manner, without resort to tyranny or persistent violent struggle, and in a way that at 
least extends a measure of toleration to diverse ways of life, then modus vivendi is 
the best way forward.”22 If this is all that Gray is claiming, then his claim for a modus 
vivendi is only that it is, like Liberalism, legitimate to the degree that it embodies the 
values of those who subscribe to it. And these values would be those of peaceful 
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coexistence and toleration. However, where these values are not shared, Gray’s 
proposal ceases to be of value. The paradox inherent in this position will be 
addressed shortly. 
GRAY’S	  PRIVILEGED	  VALUES	  
It is not clear, however, that this is all that Gray claims for his modus vivendi. 
When he writes that “Modus vivendi continues the liberal search for peaceful 
coexistence; but it does so by giving up the belief that one way of life, or a single 
type of regime, could be best for all”,23 it is apparent that he assumes that peaceful 
coexistence above all else is best for all.  Crowder maintains that this is as 
universalist as the liberal universalism Gray critiques: 
How is Gray’s position any different from the liberal universalism he 
condemns, other than in the content he gives to his privileged values? While 
Gray accuses the liberals of promoting their values of individual liberty, 
toleration and so forth over others, liberals could retort that Gray merely 
substitutes for liberal concerns a doctrine of self-interest or of peace at any 
price.”24 
Peter Lassman makes a similar observation: 
In effect, Gray smuggles in through the back door the considerations that he 
found so objectionable in other forms of liberalism, including those clearly 
belonging to the Enlightenment tradition…Gray makes the value of respect 
for other ways of life central for the stability of his version of modus vivendi. 
He is also assuming that rational citizens of a regime of modus vivendi would 
prefer compromise to conflict. It is hard to see here where the clear 
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difference exists between Gray’s modus vivendi and some of the versions of 
liberalism that he wants to reject.25 
Gray’s proposal excludes the possible goods of ways of life that wish to privilege as 
universally normative the value of “purity” or “obedience to God’s decree” above 
peaceful coexistence, as for example, Islamic Sharia law does. Or in a less extreme 
case, it excludes the possible goods of ways of life that value the universal 
responsibility of the rich for the poor. Certainly there is a case for modus vivendi in a 
shared culture where all value peaceful coexistence and share Gray’s 
values-pluralism. But this possibility raises two serious objections to Gray’s 
proposal. 
 First, in any society where people hold to the notion of universal values, in 
order to adopt a modus vivendi, they would be required to submit to a system that 
negated in theory, and in practice, their values. How this is any less hegemonic than 
liberalism, or any other political theory that comes under Gray’s criticism, is unclear. 
It precludes the beliefs of any of religious faith, any who are liberal universalists, and 
in fact any who believe in the application of any universal value. They will only be 
able to participate in a modus vivendi to the extent that they can accept a values 
pluralist reading of society, hence renouncing their universal values.. 
The second, related criticism is a pragmatic one raised by Roberts. It 
highlights what Gray himself admits – that human beings cannot live without the 
illusion (if that is what it is) of meaning, and hence of the universality of their beliefs. 
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Roberts writes: 
Indeed, whereas Gray argues for the pursuit of a modus vivendi via 
processes of bargaining, negotiation and compromise, the rival traditions he 
is seeking to reconcile are defined largely, and precisely, by those principles 
they take to be non-negotiable, not to be bargained over, not up for 
compromise. The idea that conservative Catholics and secular liberals, for 
example, might compromise over abortion is simply absurd.26 
Roberts’ point is a good one; that in order to accept the premises of a modus 
vivendi, the very conflicts that require one for their resolution are eradicated. In his 
own words:  
If the argument for the pursuit of a modus vivendi (i.e., for value pluralism) is 
conceded, then the conflicts that necessitate such a pursuit may cease to 
arise; yet, conversely, so long as there is conflict between traditions claiming 
an "historically privileged status" for their own values -- a claim, Gray now 
admits, which may be required for the reproduction of those traditions -- no 
modus vivendi will be achievable (if this means anything other than an armed 
truce, and perhaps not even then).27 
A true modus vivendi, then, may be an illusory phantom. Caught between the horns 
of the necessity of conflictual ways of life to justify its existence, and the subsequent 
requirement to surrender the universalist positions that underpin these ways of life in 
order to participate in it, modus vivendi appears to be an unworkable model for any 
actual society.  
RESOLVING	  THE	  CONTRADICTIONS:	  CONTINGENT	  TELEOLOGY	  OR	  NIHILISM	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	   Roberts,	  “The	  Endurance	  of	  History?	  Reflections	  on	  John	  Gray’s	  Post-­‐Enlightenment	  Pluralism,”	  
207.	  
27	   Ibid.,	  206–7.	  
	   81	  
 A possible resolution to these difficulties in Gray’s argument would entail, 
not the rejection of teleology, but the proposal of a contingent teleology. Without 
shared ways of life across human cultures, an orientation toward peaceful 
coexistence is without foundation. There is no reason that stands apart from shared 
ways of life that necessitates the pursuit of a modus vivendi. If there is a shared 
reason to value this as a telos, then Gray undermines his own argument that there 
are no universal human values. Gray tries to let such a shared value in through the 
back door by asserting the need for peaceful coexistence as an answer to universal 
human needs. But human needs are merely the negative form of values. If the need 
for security and peaceful coexistence is essential, which Gray’s proposal implies it 
is, then these needs can be presented as the valuing of peaceful coexistence and 
the proposal of a telos of peaceful coexistence (or a modus vivendi). That this modus 
vivendi embraces and is contingent on the imperfectability of human existence does 
nothing to invalidate it as a telos, of the kind described above. Regardless of its 
realisability, in whole or in part, it is inconsistent with Gray’s rejection of teleology. 
Therefore the most Gray can reasonably do is reject a certain kind of teleology – the 
perfectible kind – and embrace a contingent teleology: one that is modified by the 
imperfection of human existence. It is only a contingent teleology of this kind that 
can embrace both the particularity of human life and the orientation toward a 
universal telos that even Gray is unable to remove from his thinking. 
It is precisely this type of contingent teleology that Christian faith embraces. 
As Gray has acknowledged, Christianity, with its belief in divine “providence”, does 
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not seek to achieve its telos solely by human agency.28 Furthermore, its realism 
about human fallibility gives Christianity the resources to embrace imperfection 
without relinquishing teleology. Gray’s rejection of a perfectible teleology leaves him 
with the choice of either embracing a contingent teleology, or of rejecting his 
proposal of modus vivendi in favour of nihilism. 
  If Gray rejects teleology in toto, the only option left to him is nihilism, and 
the rejection of any normative proposals for politics. If there is no telos – no goal, 
regardless of how many and varied its incarnations  – then there can be no meaning 
for human life as progress. Gray is correct on that account; teleology and meaning 
go together. But a true rejection of these leaves no room for proposals of any kind. 
Newey makes this observation of Gray’s thought: 
His naturalism suggests that human striving is futile, while his nihilism about 
human values doubts whether there is anything of worth for humans to strive 
for anyway. Gray’s devaluation of all values and insistence on the vanity of 
action spell the death of politics, both in theory and practice.29 
If there is no telos for humankind, there can be no normative values – only radically 
chosen values. And choosing the values of violence and anarchy would be no less 
valid than choosing peaceful coexistence. These values are, in Gray’s scheme, 
incommensurable. To judge between them would require them to submit to some 
ultimate value (like the value of human life, for example). And it is clear, even from 
this brief analysis, that one can keep trying to ground values endlessly, and 
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hopelessly, when the belief in normative, universal values is surrendered. Although 
Gray and many other secular philosophers would like to remove belief from their 
arguments, it actually lies at the foundation of every constructive proposal – even (as 
will be demonstrated next) Gray’s. 
GRAY’S	  FAITH	  
Gray’s argument, while disparaging Enlightenment “faith” in progress, 
preaches it own article of faith: the irreducible diversity of human values. Gray’s 
values pluralism is founded on a particular reading of the world: one that privileges 
the normative value of diversity. Johnson makes this point well when he writes: 
Gray, however, simply assumes that the plurality of values is "irreducible." 
This implies, a fortiori, that it is irreducible by rational criticism and 
discussion. It implies that there is nothing that we can say about any 
particular value to recommend that it be adopted to the exclusion of other, 
incompatible values - nothing, save our arbitrary choice to value it, take it or 
leave it. Values, in short, are personal, idiosyncratic, not publicly-justifiable.30 
Gray’s position as a values-pluralist is no more rationally defensible than the “myth 
of progress” which he rejects. As Johnson explains, it simply does not follow that the 
existence of plural values in any way proves that this plurality is irreducible or 
normative. For Gray to privilege his values pluralism is no less of a mythologizing 
than the “Enlightenment faith in progress”. Glyn Morgan writes: 
But if Gray’s argument for a modus vivendi depends upon a wide public 
acceptance of this form of multiculturalism then Gray’s modus vivendi rests 
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upon foundations no less controversial, no less sectarian, than the 
substantive form of liberalism that he is so eager to dispatch. Indeed, Gray’s 
argument for a modus vivendi polity involves the abandonment of a ‘myth’ of 
progress in favour of a ‘myth’ of diversity.”31 
The reliance of values pluralism on the foundational “myth” of diversity 
undermines Gray’s claim that values pluralism is distinct from relativism. If Gray’s 
claim regarding the irreducible plurality of values is a foundationalist one, then values 
pluralism cannot claim to be anything other than the assertion that all values are of 
equal standing and therefore relative. Gregory Johnson, in analysing Isaiah Berlin’s 
value pluralism – which is the source of Gray’s conception – demonstrates that 
Berlin’s account fails to maintain the objectivity of values, and thus plunges his 
values pluralism into relativism. This devastating critique cuts to the very heart of 
Gray’s argument, and will be quoted at length: 
Berlin's first claim - that objective values can be publicly understood but 
subjective values cannot - seems to miss the point of the objection against 
him. Above I claimed that Berlin and Gray are value relativists and 
subjectivists because they hold that the multiplicity of conflicting values is in 
principle irreducible. To claim that the multiplicity of values is irreducible in 
principle implies, a fortiori, that it is not reducible through rational 
investigation and argumentation. It means that there is nothing about any 
particular value that can recommend its adoption to the exclusion of another, 
incompatible value. This amounts to saying that all values are equally 
groundless. The issue, then, is not whether values can be publicly 
understood, but whether they can be publicly justified. Berlin is a relativist 
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not because he claims that values are not publicly intelligible - which he does 
not - but because he claims that they are not publicly justifiable.32 
If there is no common ground for the justification of one set of values over another, 
then these values are more than incommensurable, they are also relative – relative to 
the ways of life from which they spring. 
Gray’s defence of values pluralism against the charge of relativism requires 
some careful analysis. Gray grounds the source of values in “ways of life” so that 
when different ways of life come into contact with each other, they often will not 
have the shared presuppositions needed in order to decide between their values.33 If 
this were all that Gray argued, then the charge of relativism would be 
straightforward, given that no rational grounds could be made to argue for these 
values. In the absence of any rational argument for the preferring of one value over 
another, values from differing ways of life are deemed “relative”. Gray characterises 
this objection as follows:  
The assumption underlying it is that if values are incommensurate they must 
belong to forms of life that have no categories or concepts in common. If this 
is so, judgments deploying values that are incommensurable cannot be 
mutually translatable. They are bound to be mutually unintelligible.34 
In response to this Gray asserts that people are not “radically situated subjects, 
embedded once and for all in a single way of life. Nearly all of us belong in several 
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ways of life.”35 The fact that we can participate in different ways of life and still 
decide between values from these opposing (in Gray’s words “incommensurable”) 
ways of life, confirms the fact that these values can be evaluated rationally, hence 
they are not relative, but incommensurable; they can be decided between, but not in 
one best way that privileges one over the other. 
Gray’s error in this argument is that he has assumed that ways of life, and the 
values they promote, are irresistibly normative for an individual. He assumes that, 
when one is faced with the competing claims of loyalty to a friend and the claims of 
honouring a contractual agreement (to use Gray’s example, cited in the first 
chapter),36 there is no reasonable way to resolve this conflict that is right for every 
person. Nonetheless a decision can still be made between them based on the 
context and history of the individual who makes the decision. Gray’s mistake here is 
in assuming that the values of loyalty and honour are given the same weight in an 
individual’s thinking, as if they emerged out of two rival ways of life that have equal 
and incommensurable claims on that individual. However, this is an inaccurate 
account of human rationality. For the individual concerned, these values no longer 
belong to “rival ways of life”, and the individual is not torn between them, like some 
chameleon that cannot choose which of two backgrounds to assume the colour of. 
Individuals conceive of themselves and their lives as a unity, and as Gray recognises, 
they will make a rational choice between values based on their own ranking of 
values. But “loyalty” and “honour” get their relative “value” in the individual’s life 
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from the role they play in the individual’s own telos or conception of “the good life” 
for themselves. If “the good life” consists chiefly in good relationships, then loyalty 
trumps honour. Conversely, if it consists chiefly in respect and business prowess, 
then honour will trump loyalty. What Gray’s simplistic account of the relationship of 
human life to values overlooks is the necessary connection between values and a 
telos, or a conception of the good. Where individuals do not share a similar view of 
the good, they do not share the same system of values. A plurality of values reduces 
to a plurality of teloi. When values lack a shared telos, they lack the one thing that 
enables their “value” to be reasoned about, and hence their relationship to each 
other is one of being relative.37  
Finally, Newey lays the same charge against values-pluralism, from a 
macroscopic perspective. In his critique of Gray, he demonstrates the essential 
logical inconsistency within the values pluralist position: 
As Gray argues, values-pluralism is not to be confused with relativism. But if 
so, some political orders may surely be better than others at accommodating 
value-pluralism (though Gray rejects the claim that liberalism itself is such an 
order). It only seems to follow that no single regime is best at 
accommodating value-pluralism if each possible political order embodies a 
set of values, and value-incommensurability means that reason cannot 
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decide which set is best. But then we seem to be left with relativism after 
all.38 
While this kind of argument appears circular – some polities will embody values 
pluralism in better ways than others, yet no set of values can be reasonably argued 
to be better than others – it demonstrates the key philosophical difficulty with values 
pluralism: it tries to argue for its own position as being most true while 
simultaneously claiming there is no singularly true position. Gray argues that values 
pluralism is a truth about our world, as well as arguing that it reveals there is no 
singular truth about our world. Like every other truth claim, Gray’s claim for values 
pluralism takes its stand within its own presuppositions about the nature of the 
world. But if values pluralism is nothing more than the privileging of particular 
presuppositions about the nature of values, presuppositions that are inconsistent 
with Gray’s own claims to objectivity, then the very foundations of his argument have 
been eroded. Gray seeks to find an objective place to ground his modus vivendi 
through values pluralism, but in its grounding on the “myth of diversity” it is revealed 
to be as subjective, as much a “faith”, as any other perspective which Gray seeks to 
critique. 
Gray’s own dependence on a faith position, despite his criticism of such 
positions, suggests that all arguments are ultimately grounded on belief – or else 
they are grounded on nothing. In critiquing Liberalism, and in proposing a modus 
vivendi as a “better” political proposal, Gray has been seeking to position himself in 
a more objective or truthful place than that of Liberalism. Curiously, Gray has 
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conceded the fruitlessness of the search for such an objective place to stand. In 
Enlightenment’s Wake, referring to Neitzsche’s commentary on modernity, he writes: 
“…the upshot of the Neitzschean critique is that all valuation is perspectival. There is 
no view from nowhere which is ‘the moral point of view’; there are only diverse 
moralities and value-perspectives.”39 It is ironic, then, that Gray, in grounding his 
modus vivendi in values pluralism and the “myth of diversity”, considers himself to 
have made a compelling rational argument that “Modus vivendi continues the liberal 
search for peaceful coexistence; but it does so by giving up the belief that one way 
of life, or a single type of regime, could be best for all.”40 In saying this, Gray has 
only confirmed the truth of his argument that all values spring from, and are limited 
by, their contexts. 
Gray’s argument then demonstrates the validity of MacIntyre’s analysis of 
modernity. In After Virtue MacIntyre argues that the modern person still retains the 
vestiges of pre-modern morality – a morality that was underpinned by a shared way 
of life, with shared values and a shared telos. Modern moral disagreements are so 
intractable because they no longer have these shared moral foundations within 
which to conduct rational debate. Our modern moral perspective is one that 
MacIntyre labels “emotivism”: the expression of subjective preference, which can 
have no rational basis. On this point, Gray and MacIntyre are in agreement; there are 
no rational resolutions to many of our modern moral debates. However, MacIntyre 
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attributes these intractable moral conflicts to a loss of that shared telos that once 
unified our common moral life. Gray, by contrast, sees moral conflict as a 
fundamental characteristic of reality. Whether or not reality is teleological is a matter 
of bare assertion – it is a foundationalist claim. Gray’s assertion that reality is 
irreducibly plural and therefore without a telos is as much a foundationalist claim, as 
much an article of faith, as any other claim to meaning or teleology. Gray’s exclusion 
of meaning from human existence is made without sufficient recourse to any rational 
arguments. The presence or absence of a meaning for human life can only be 
affirmed or denied, as an article of faith. Gray denies it, assuming that chaos is more 
fundamental than meaning. But there is no rational reason why the alternative 
assumption should not be made.  
It is true, as Gray recognises, that there can be no solely rational argument for 
ultimate values. But that does not mean that ultimate values don’t exist; it only 
means that they don’t exist for those who rely solely on rationality. To seek to 
understand human existence in purely rational terms is to reduce the nature of 
human being. Humans are more than rational animals. Gray asserts 
meaninglessness and chaos, not for rational or empirical reasons but as an act of 
faith in the nothingness, in the nihil. The only alternative to nihilism is faith in order 
and meaningfulness (and perhaps also in some form of deity as their source). The 
fact that human beings cannot seem to live without a sense of order and meaning 
tells in favour of such faith, unless, as Gray believes, such a need rests on an illusion. 
This concludes the immanent critique of Gray’s position. His argument is 
weakened considerably by the logical inconsistencies. He tries to claim a limited 
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scope of meaning for human life: one that rejects the notion of progress but is still 
able to support the flourishing of human life for no other reason than its own 
flourishing. Of course, these are ultimate questions and perhaps not ones that can 
be resolved rationally. However, by the rules he has chosen to play by, much of what 
he wishes to say is excluded. In particular, he has failed to notice the dependence of 
all rational thought on non-rational presuppositions, making him oblivious to the 
faith-like quality of his own stance. We now turn from the internal coherence of 
Gray’s argument to the external claims he makes regarding Christianity and 
violence. 
CHRISTIANITY	  AND	  VIOLENCE	  
The relationship between religion and violence is central to the thesis of Black 
Mass, and it is a relationship that is not as straightforward as it at first appears. The 
first sentence of the book is the key to understanding Gray’s argument: “Modern 
politics is a chapter in the history of religion.”41 Gray goes on to argue, not that 
religion is violent, but that modern politics is violent because of its religious origins. 
While Gray traces utopian thinking to a secularised eschatology, it is precisely in the 
secularisation of these Christian hopes that they become violent. Gray writes: 
Post-millenialist Christians propagated beliefs that mutated into the secular 
faith in progress; but so long as history was believed to be governed by 
providence there was no attempt to direct it by violence…The decline of 
Christianity and the rise of revolutionary utopianism go together.42 
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Christianity is implicated as a source of modern violence through the secularisation 
of its hopes. But Christianity itself is not inherently violent, Gray concedes; it is the 
mutation of Christianity in modern politics that is violent.  
Gray does lay blame on Christianity for introducing these hopes to humanity, 
however. He argues that before Christianity introduced a teleological outlook to the 
world, Enlightenment thinking and the political violence that has accompanied it 
were not possible. “Christianity injected eschatology into the heart of western 
civilization,”43 writes Gray. He also asserts: “Most religions lack any conception of 
history as a story with a beginning and an end…Ancient Judaism contained nothing 
resembling the idea that the world was about to come to an end.”44 On this point, 
Gray is patently wrong. Recent Christian scholarship has contextualised Jesus’ 
message and mission squarely within Jewish apocalyptic hopes of an imminent 
judgement, “The Day of the Lord”, when God would end the present order and 
establish a new, just order. New Testament scholar N.T. Wright notes that: 
[M]onotheism and election, committed any Jew who thought about it for a 
moment to a further belief: YHWH, as the creator and covenant god, was 
irrevocably committed to further action of some sort in history, which would 
bring about the end of Israel’s desolation and the vindication of his true 
people. Monotheism and election lead to eschatology, and eschatology 
means the renewal of the covenant.45 
It is a commonplace in New Testament scholarship to identify the aims and 
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eschatology of Christianity as springing from, and standing in continuity with, the 
aims and eschatology of early Judaism. 
More comprehensively, in his Atheist Delusions, David Bentley-Hart makes a 
particularly devastating and insightful critique of exactly this species of argument 
which Gray invokes. It merits quoting at length: 
One does occasionally hear it argued, I should note, that the great utopian 
projects of the twentieth century were not, in fact, genuinely secular 
movements, but, rather, misplaced messianisms, and as such should be 
seen as only the delayed aftereffects of the old arrangement. On this telling, 
Christianity – with its promise of a future Kingdom of God – planted a kind of 
persistent hope in Western culture that, once robbed of its supernatural 
trappings, naturally mutated into a demonic rage to establish heaven on 
earth, through a great process of election and dereliction, culminating in 
historical fires of judgement … But, really, one should not take these sorts of 
speculation too seriously. Long before the rise of Christianity, the great 
empires of antiquity – Egyptian, Persian, Chinese, Roman, and so forth – all 
claimed a sacred mission and a divine warrant for their conquests, plunders, 
enslavements, and murders. Temporal power will kill when it chooses to do 
so, according to its interests and desires, and will employ whatever mythic or 
ideological instruments lie ready to hand to advance its aims. That Jewish 
and Christian apocalyptic motifs can be vaguely discerned in the grotesque 
tapestries of twentieth century ideology is hardly any indication of causal 
order…Since the one explicit and inviolable rule that has always governed 
Christian eschatology is that God’s Kingdom is not of this world and comes 
only at God’s bidding … and since, for just this reason, Christian culture 
never produced any movement of salvation through political action, it is only 
to the degree that eschatological rhetoric is entirely alienated from any 
traditional Christian context that it can be exploited for a political project of 
human redemption. But this is only to reiterate that, in the end, it is the 
process of secularization itself – and not those elements of the “religious” 
grammars of the past that the secular order might have misappropriated for 
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its purposes – that is the chief cause of the modern state’s curious talent for 
mass murder.46  
Bentley-Hart agrees it is secularization that has bred violence, but more accurately 
than Gray he describes the “religious grammar” of Christian eschatology as a tool 
which secularisation has appropriated in service of its own aims, rather than it having 
caused modern political violence. Christian eschatology is not intrinsically violent. 
Gray himself recognises violence is a peculiarly human trait, and he acknowledges 
that human beings are “a highly inventive species that is also one of the most 
predatory and destructive.”47 Gray is correct that secularism is the source of modern 
political violence, not because of some specifically Christian inheritance but because 
it has an agenda of its own, one that has resulted in the unprecedented violence of 
the modern era. 
The thesis that secularism is inherently violent is advanced further by 
theologian William Cavanaugh. In The Myth of Religious Violence, Cavanaugh 
examines the common claim that religion is inherently violent. He argues that by 
defining religion in particular ways, and by reading history with a bias against 
religion, secular historians and political thinkers have presented Western history (and 
in particular the “Thirty Years War” following the Reformation) as being riddled with 
religious violence. This particular reading, Cavanaugh points out, is used to establish 
the modernist assertion that it is only the secular nation state that has any legitimate 
right to use violence. After a detailed analysis of the “wars of religion”, Cavanaugh 
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comes to the following conclusions: 
We must conclude that the myth of the wars of religion is finally incredible, 
which is to say, false. A significant proportion of the violence was between 
members of the same church, and members of different churches often 
collaborated…It is impossible to separate religious motives from political, 
economic and social causes…And the idea that the advent of the state 
solved the violence ignores abundant evidence that state building was 
perhaps the most significant cause of the violence.48 
Secularism’s claim to neutrality amidst religious tensions is a myth that serves to 
legitimate the ideology of the modern state and its own (often violent) purposes. 
Cavanaugh explicates this thesis with great clarity: 
My hypothesis is that the myth of the wars of religion – like the larger myth of 
religious violence – has been useful for the promotion of Western secular 
forms of governance as essentially peace making. According to the myth, 
only by carefully separating the dangerous impulses of religion from the 
mundane affairs of politics – as the liberal state has done – can a peaceful 
and prosperous world be finally achieved. In domestic politics, the myth 
serves both to legitimate devotion to the nation-state and to marginalize 
actors labelled religious from the public square. In foreign affairs, the myth 
serves to justify efforts to promote and propagate Western forms of 
governance in the non-Western world, by violence if necessary.49 
The myth of religious violence is used to support the aims of the nation state and to 
facilitate “the substitution of the religion of the state for the religion of the church.”50 
Like Gray, Cavanaugh sees post-Enlightenment secularism as “a chapter in the 
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history of religion.”51 However, while Gray would go further to argue that it is a 
chapter of larger Christian history, and a mutated expression of Christianity, 
Cavanaugh argues that it is a competing religion in its own right, with its own faith: 
the sacredness of the nation state. Secular nationalism has replaced so-called 
“religious” worship. He writes: “…ours is an unliturgical age in most respects, with 
one enormous exception: the public life of the citizen of the nation-state. Citizenship 
in secular countries is tied to symbols and rituals that have been invented for the 
purpose of expressing and reinforcing devotion to the nation-state.”52 This further 
supports the idea that all positions are finally faith positions, including all political 
positions, and that what is at issue in Gray’s argument is a conflict of rival faiths. 
GRAY’S	  THOUGHT	  AS	  A	  CHRISTIAN	  CHAPTER	  IN	  THE	  HISTORY	  OF	  RELIGION	  
Gray critiques Enlightenment and utopian thinkers as being shaped by 
Christianity, even as they have tried to free themselves from it. He even criticises the 
New Atheists as being shaped by the very thing they deny. In Straw Dogs he writes:  
Unbelief is a move in a game whose rules are set by believers. To deny the 
existence of God is to accept the categories of monotheism… Atheists say 
they want a secular world, but a world defined by the absence of the 
Christians’ god is still a Christian world. Secularism is like chastity, a 
condition defined by what it denies.53 
Gray is unaware, however, of the way the horizons of his own thought have been 
shaped by Christianity, of how his own proposal is in some ways a parody of the 
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Christian gospel. In much the same way that Gray accuses modern, secular politics 
of being a “Black Mass” – a perversion of Christian eschatological hopes of salvation 
for humankind – Gray’s own proposal is a “Mass” of a similar kind. This is revealed 
by the horizons of hope that define Gray’s proposal and within which his thought 
resides.  
Gray’s concern to limit violence in favour of peaceful coexistence is an 
expression of values that have been shaped by Christianity. In his compelling book 
Atheist Delusions, David Bentley-Hart demonstrates the way that Christianity 
irrevocably re-shaped the world: 
…how enormous a transformation of thought, sensibility, culture, morality, 
and spiritual imagination Christianity constituted in the age of pagan Rome; 
the liberation it offered from fatalism, cosmic despair, and the terror of occult 
agencies; the immense dignity it conferred upon the human person; its 
subversion of the cruellest aspects of pagan society…and its elevation of 
charity above all other virtues.54 
Bentley-Hart concurs with Gray’s assertion that the ultimate dignity and value of the 
human person is a Christian invention. Gray considers it an illusion, and his proposal 
of modus vivendi is an attempt to found a politics without recourse to this illusion. 
Yet his modus vivendi is itself a product of Christianity’s anthropological 
foundations. Implicit in Gray’s proposal, and in his wider work, is the assumption 
that violence is an evil. Gray composes a list of “universal evils” – “to be tortured, or 
forced to witness the torture of loved ones or compatriots; to be separated from 
one’s friends, family or country; to be subjected to humiliation or persecution, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	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  Atheist	  Delusions:	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  and	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  xi.	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threatened with genocide; to be locked in poverty or avoidable ill-health.”55 These 
are all “great evils”. Gray takes the nature of these evils to be in some way 
self-evident, arguing that they constrain “the forms of life in which they [human 
beings] can thrive.”56 But in pre-Christian pagan thought these “evils” were believed 
to be part of the divine order. The “common-sense” realism that advocates the 
abolition of these evils is, according to Bentley Hart, a child of that “grand 
reimagining of the possibilities of human existence”57 which was the Christian 
transformation of the world. Gray’s self-evident moral insight confirms 
Bentley-Hart’s affirmation that “once the world has been seen in this [Christian] way, 
it can never again be what it formerly was.”58 Gray grounds his modus vivendi on the 
belief that peaceful coexistence is required for human beings to flourish. But the 
presupposition that human existence can even have such a meaning as “flourishing” 
– that it could be anything more than a meaningless endurance of the capricious 
turns of fate – is, Bentley-Hart argues, a Christian one. “For most philosophers and 
political theorists”, Gray observes, “ignorance of religion is a point of professional 
honour, and they are unaware that many of their views are secular versions of 
religious beliefs.”59 It appears Gray unwittingly also falls in this category. 
Furthermore, if the existence of a transcendent meaningful teleology is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	   Gray,	  Two	  Faces	  of	  Liberalism,	  66.	  
56	   Ibid.	  
57	   Bentley-­‐Hart,	  Atheist	  Delusions:	  The	  Christian	  Revolution	  and	  Its	  Fashionable	  Enemies,	  174.	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   Ibid.	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   John	  Gray,	  “Reply	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  Political	  Theory	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  John	  Gray	  (London:	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surrendered, the moral vacuum left will most likely be filled by expressions of the will 
to power, rather than a modus vivendi. Bentley-Hart explains: 
If there really is no transcendent source of the good to which the will is 
naturally drawn, but only the power of the will to decide what ends it desires 
– by which to create and determine itself for itself – then no human project 
can be said to be inherently irrational, or (for that matter) inherently 
abominable. If freedom of the will is our supreme value, after all, then it is for 
all intents and purposes our god.60 
In the wake of the consciousness that Christianity bequeathed the world, human life 
will “flourish” far less than before. Bentley Hart continues: 
This was Nietzsche’s greatest fear: the loss of any transcendent aspiration 
that could coax mighty works of cultural imagination out of a people. When 
the aspiring ape ceases to think himself a fallen angel, perhaps he will 
inevitably resign himself to being an ape, and then become contented with 
his lot, and ultimately even rejoice that the universe demands little more from 
him than an ape’s contentment.61 
If for “contented ape” we substitute Gray’s “straw dogs”, we end up at the same 
place. More likely than a modus vivendi is a war of all against all and, in the absence 
of a Christianity-inspired humanism of the past, such a project of war and violence 
cannot “be said to be inherently irrational, or … inherently abominable.”62 
Gray’s designation of the Christian inheritance of anthropocentrism and 
teleology as “necessary illusions” is his only solution to the degradation of human 
existence that the abandonment of this inheritance invites. This begs a final question 
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that must be levelled at Gray, which is, why exclude the possibility of genuine faith 
from the outset? He presupposes that Christian belief is an “illusion”. He rejects the 
Enlightenment thinking and utopianism that Christianity has engendered as 
inherently violent, while recognising that in its pure form Christian teleological 
thinking was not violent. He rejects secular humanism on the grounds that it is 
dishonest in its distancing of itself from its Christian progenitor, yet understands that 
human existence seems incapable of perpetuating itself in ways that allows it to 
“flourish” without clinging to the meaning and dignity which Christianity conferred on 
the human species. He laments the ontological narrowing of human life to one telos, 
one view of “the good.” But, as we will see in the next chapter, Christian theology, 
far better than Gray’s alternative, is able to sustain the unity-in-diversity that appears 
to be a prerequisite for the flourishing of human existence. Were it not for Gray’s 
unquestioned rejection of Christian faith, he may have discovered theological 
resources that are able to rescue him from the Scylla and Charybdis of moral 
hegemony and nihilism, which shipwreck his proposal. It is to these resources – to 
the Christian vision of human existence – and the ability therein to resolve the 
tensions within Gray’s thought that this discussion turns next. 
SUMMARY	  
Gray’s proposal of a modus vivendi is at odds with his rejection of teleology. 
Not only does it posit a (sub-) ideal as an implicit telos, it also privileges his own 
chosen value of peaceful coexistence. Furthermore, his argument rests on the 
acceptance of values pluralism, which, rather than being a fact about the world, as 
Gray claims, is in truth a faith position of the very kind of which Gray is critical. The 
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only consistent position for Gray would be one of nihilism - a position that proposes 
nothing. A modus vivendi is also rendered unworkable by the fact that it relies on its 
adherents renouncing the universality of their values. If that were to occur, a modus 
vivendi would no longer be necessary.  
Gray’s account of modern political violence as being the offspring of Christian 
eschatology ignores the violent tendencies present within secularism and the 
state-building nationalism that accompanies it. Rather than bearing the seeds of 
violence, Christianity provides the horizon for Gray’s own valuing of peaceful 
coexistence and human flourishing.  
  
CHAPTER	  4:	  HOPE	  REMAINS	  
JÜRGEN	  MOLTMANN’S	  CHRISTIAN	  ESCHATOLOGY	  
INTRODUCTION	  
John Gray’s philosophy and political proposal highlight the connection 
between values and a telos – the goal or vision of “the good”. Gray’s view of the 
good as “peaceful coexistence” and “human flourishing” privileges the value of 
tolerance that underpin his modus vivendi. What is less obvious, but has been 
demonstrated above, is that our presuppositions or assumptions about the way the 
world is, and in particular, the way humanity is, shape our view of the good (our 
telos). Because, in Gray’s anthropology, human beings are assumed to be irrational 
individuals with conflicting animal needs, the only “good” that is open to them is one 
that minimises suffering and conflict – Gray’s modus vivendi. Values therefore arise 
out of the telos of a given tradition or scheme of thought, but the telos is shaped by 
fundamental assumptions about the world and our place in it. As has been 
demonstrated, in Gray’s thought, these assumptions are a “faith” – an assumption 
about the world, independent of rational reasons or empirical evidence. It could be 
argued that all thought rests on these kinds of protological assumptions – that every 
perspective is ultimately a “faith” perspective, regardless of the rational scheme 
constructed on top of that foundation. 
Christianity, and religion in general, have been characterised as inherently 
violent in recent times. William Cavanaugh has recently argued that this is a canard; 
it is a myth deployed in the service of secularisation and the establishment of the 
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nation state, as a means to legitimate the “rational” violence employed by the state, 
in contrast to the “irrational” religious violence from which secularism has “saved 
us”. This chapter will seek to analyse the role and content of Christian eschatology, 
which Gray has identified as being the source of modern political violence. As the 
telos of the Christian faith, Christian eschatology also grounds Christian values, one 
of which (it will be argued) is peace. It also gives expression to fundamental 
assumptions about the world and about the role of human beings in it. In Christian 
theological terms, the shape of redemption is already implied in the nature of original 
creation. Gray’s “creation story” is one of original chaos, and even his attempt to 
provide some form of meaning to human existence cannot avoid the nihil; the 
nothingness, the void at the core of reality. In order to determine the shape of the 
Christian telos – eschatology – we must first examine its foundational assumptions 
about who we are, and what the world is. Gray is correct in saying that for Christians, 
“human beings have infinite worth because they partake of the divine personality 
that created them.”1 So it is to the divine person that this discussion will turn first, in 
order to establish the contours of a Christian ontology, anthropology, teleology and 
ethics. 
Our discussion will focus largely on the theology of Jürgen Moltmann, who in 
recent times has made significant contributions to the study of Christian 
eschatology2. In particular he has demonstrated how it is ontology  (assumptions 
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  Enlightenment’s	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  158.	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about the way things are) that grounds the telos (the vision of the way that things 
should be). From this, an ethics can be derived, as the kind of action that best 
reflects and helps to bring about the telos. In Gray’s view, violence is the ethics of 
utopian politics. In Moltmann’s thought, peace and love are the ethics of a Christian 
“eschatology of hope”. 
Moltmann addresses the transformation of Christian eschatology into the 
utopian impulse, and its violent implications. As such, he makes an ideal 
conversation partner for John Gray. Moltmann’s introductory words to The Coming 
of God, a volume that specifically addresses eschatology, highlight the shared 
subject matter and perspective between him and Gray. It also provides an excellent 
introduction to the significance of eschatology for the times in which we live: 
The terrors of twentieth-century history irrevocably shattered all 
nineteenth-century chiliastic and messianic projects, in both their religious 
and their secular form. What took their place? In many countries and in many 
sectors of life they were replaced by apocalyptic, whether in its religious or 
its secular form. Just as millenarianism draws eschatology into history in a 
positive sense, in order to establish the kingdom of God 'already here on 
earth' (Heinrich Heine's phrase), modern apocalyptic draws eschatology into 
history in a negative sense, in order 'already here on earth' to enact the 
nuclear 'Armageddon' and the ecological 'Chernobyl'. 
Consciously or unconsciously, the eschatological thinking of the present day 
is determined by the messianic visions of the nineteenth century, and by the 
apocalyptic terrors experienced in the history of the twentieth. What hope 
can be justified, once we wake up out of the messianic dreams and resist the 
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  (From	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  back	  cover	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book).	  There	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  also	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  secondary	  literature	  engaging	  with	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  this	  chapter.	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apocalyptic anxieties? What can eschatology mean, if it cannot be drawn 
into history, either chiliastically or apocalyptically, without destroying the 
world? As we have seen, the eschatological problem of the present day is 
not merely theological; it is political too. It is the problem of history itself.3 
Moltmann’s theology describes a Christian eschatology that can underpin a 
peaceful and hopeful ethical engagement with the social and natural worlds. 
Moltmann describes a “between space” of ethical engagement, whereby human 
beings are caught between the present and the perfect future inaugurated through 
Christ’s death and resurrection. This “between space” frees human beings from the 
hopeless determinacy of the past, without allowing them to indulge in a Promethean 
utopianism, of the kind that Gray describes as ultimately violent. This has the ability 
to rescue humankind from the character of modern life as interminable progress – a 
similarly Promethean punishment of endless repetition of that which has gone 
before. Both Gray and Moltmann agree that the modern age is condemned to the 
excesses and impending doom of ecological collapse if a new way of being that 
surpasses modern consciousness is not embraced. In what follows we will outline 
Moltmann’s account of Christian eschatology, in order to contrast it with its 
“parodies” and to draw out its significance as a source of political peace and hope, 
rather than violence 
MOLTMANN’S	  TRINITARIAN	  ONTOLOGY	  
Moltmann begins his contribution to systematic theology with a volume in 
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which he develops a “social doctrine of the Trinity.”4 What makes him an excellent 
conversation partner for Gray’s political and ecological concerns, is his proposal that 
since “God is a community of Father, Son and Spirit, whose unity is constituted by 
mutual indwelling and reciprocal interpenetration” it follows that “we find the earthly 
reflection of the divine sociality, not in the autocracy of a single ruler but in the 
democratic community of free people.”5 The way that God is conceived, in other 
words, determines the way that human beings are to be conceived. Theology - and 
specifically the doctrine of God – has implications for the way that politics is 
construed. 
While it is outside of the scope of this discussion to analyse the (vast) history 
of Trinitarian theology, it will be helpful to highlight a few significant Trinitarian 
concepts. First, Jewish monotheism has been the chief determinant for Christian 
theology; in particular the foundational assertion of the Jewish Shema (a prayer and 
confession of faith), “Hear, O Israel, the Lord is our God, the Lord is one.”6 However, 
from early on in its history Christianity asserted the divinity of Jesus Christ, and the 
distinctive identity of the Holy Spirit. The Trinity is a theological attempt to reconcile 
the three “persons” of the Christian godhead – Father, Son and Spirit – with the one 
God of Judaism: one God in three persons. This is the classic formulation of the 
Trinity, one that involves the philosophical problem of resolving God’s oneness with 
God’s three-ness. Moltmann critiques those ways of conceiving the Trinity that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	   Jürgen	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  Trinity	  and	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  (Fortress	  Press,	  1993),	  viii.	  
5	   Ibid.	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begin with the oneness of God, arguing that they relapse into simple monotheism, 
and this has political consequences. If there is one undifferentiated God, then there 
is also only one will for human beings, and human rule, reflecting the image of God, 
will be that of “lordship” over others. He writes: “…monotheism was, and is, always 
a ‘political problem’ too. Strict monotheism has to be theocratically conceived and 
implemented, as Islam proves.”7 Monotheism results in political domination rather 
than freedom. However, it is not on these grounds only that Moltmann rejects the 
priority of the oneness of God in the formulation of the Trinity. 
Moltmann grounds his Trinitarian theology, of God’s self-revelation through 
Jesus Christ, in biblical history. Beginning with the advent of Christ, Moltmann 
argues that the three persons of the Trinity are primary, which means that the 
oneness of God becomes the chief problem for Trinitarian theology, rather than how 
to maintain the integrity of the persons in the face of that oneness. “It seems to make 
more sense theologically,” writes Moltmann, “to start from the biblical history and 
therefore to make the unity of the three divine persons the problem.”8 If we begin 
with Christ as the foundation of God’s revelation, then the persons are antecedent to 
the oneness of God. 
The orthodox solution to the “problem” of the unity of the three persons is the 
concept of perichoresis. While it is a complex doctrine, Alister McGrath explains 
perichoresis succinctly as follows: 
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It refers to the manner in which the three persons of the Trinity relate to one 
another. The concept of perichoresis allows the individuality of the persons 
to be maintained, while insisting that each person shares in the life of the 
other two. An image often used to express this idea is that of a “community 
of being,” in which each person, while maintaining its distinctive identity, 
penetrates the others and is penetrated by them.9 
This idea establishes the notion of person as inseparable from its relation to other 
persons. It contradicts the modern notion of the person as a radical individual. 
McGrath notes that, “This notion has important implications for Christian political 
thought … The mutual relationships among three co-equal persons within the 
Godhead have been argued to provide a model both for human relationships within 
communities and for Christian political and social theorizing.”10 Gray was correct in 
stating that the concept of the “person” is largely determined by the notion of who 
God is. However, Gray begins from the concept of the person as individual, a 
conception that reduces all human relationship to competition and conflict.  
TRINITARIAN	  ANTHROPOLOGY	  
Trinitarian theology employs a notion of “personhood” that is in many ways 
antithetical to modern individuality. Moltmann reflects on the “modern bourgeois 
world’s cultivation of the individual,”11 noting that its consequence is that: 
…every individual must be able to develop himself into a many-sided 
personality. He only has to observe the equal rights of every other person to 
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  Christian	  Theology:	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   Ibid.,	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life, liberty and happiness. The other person is the only thing that limits the 
development of one’s own personality and the realization of one’s own self.12 
Modern individualism, however, stands in contrast to an authentically “trinitarian 
anthropology”, where: “A person is only God’s image in fellowship with other 
people.”13 In a trinitarian anthropology, the isolated individual is not truly a person. 
A trinitarian anthropology overcomes notions of conflict, power and 
dominance through an ontology of love. Love, understood in this way, consists of 
finding one’s being in relation to another, without losing one’s own identity. Once 
persons are defined through the mutuality of their relationships, human community 
becomes the ideal - the completion of our individuality, rather than the limitation of it. 
Moltmann writes that: “the Trinity corresponds to a community in which people are 
defined through their relations with one another and in their significance for one 
another, not in opposition to one another, in terms of power and possession.”14 
Elsewhere, Moltmann explains: “…people are made in the image of God. But the 
divine image is not the individual; it is person with person.” More than that, it is 
finding oneself in the other.15 A person is a relation, in a Trinitarian ontology, rather 
than an independent individual. The ideal relation is that of love – each finding their 
being in the other. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	   Ibid.	  
13	   Ibid.	  
14	   Ibid.,	  198.	  
15	   An	  example	  of	  how	  human	  nature	  demonstrates	  this	  trinitarian	  personhood	  is	  the	  way	  that	  
self-­‐identity	  is	  developed	  in	  an	  individual	  through	  the	  interactions	  of	  others	  and	  the	  way	  others	  
“intend”	  that	  person.	  See	  Alastair	  McFadyen,	  The	  Call	  to	  Personhood:	  A	  Christian	  Theory	  of	  the	  
Individual	  in	  Social	  Relationships	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1990).	  
	   110	  
A trinitarian anthropology requires a redefinition of freedom – the highest 
value of liberal politics – and provides a synthesis between the antithetical (and as 
Gray would say, incommensurable) demands of a notion of freedom founded on the 
understanding of persons as individuals. In the modern, individualistic conception of 
freedom, Moltmann notes that: “Everyone finds in the other person a competitor in 
the struggle for power and possession. Everyone is for everyone else merely the 
limitation of his own freedom.”16 However, if a person is not an individual but, on the 
contrary, is defined by their relation to others, then freedom assumes a social 
dimension. This radically transforms the concept of freedom and overcomes the 
incommensurability of rival freedoms. Moltmann explains: 
It is only in love that human freedom arrives at its truth. I am free and feel 
myself to be truly free when I am respected and recognized by others and 
when I for my part respect and recognize them. I become truly free when I 
open my life for other people and share with them, and when other people 
open their lives for me and share them with me. Then the other person is no 
longer the limitation of my freedom; he is an expansion of it.17 
When conceived in a trinitarian manner, freedom is not limited by sociality; it is 
enhanced and expanded by it. The being of one finds its completion and 
confirmation in the being of the other(s). The fundamental conflict at the foundation 
of human political life is transformed into a fundamental harmony.  
A trinitarian understanding of personhood points to a telos of harmony for 
political life. If human being, being ontologically constituted by the trinitarian God, is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	   Moltmann,	  The	  Trinity	  and	  the	  Kingdom,	  215.	  
17	   Ibid.,	  216.	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understood to be that of mutual relation, then this is definitive of the ideal political 
forms for human society. Moltmann scholar Timothy Harvie, in his volume Jürgen 
Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope, contrasts the consequences of a trinitarian theology 
with that of a “Monistic” theology: 
Moltmann opposes his understanding of perichoresis to monistic, or what he 
calls monotheistic, notions of God. Moltmann then applies this theological 
discussion to politico-ethical praxis by arguing that one’s conception of the 
divine automatically results in particular human analogues which seek to 
mirror the divine reality through a political mimesis of God’s inner life. 
Depending on the prior construal of God as either monotheistic or as Trinity, 
Moltmann argues that the resultant mimetic activity in the political realm is 
either totalitarian and oppressive in the case of the former, or communal and 
liberating in the case of the latter.18 
A trinitarian ontology suggests not only an ontology of love, but also an anthropology 
- and hence a politics - of peaceful human co-existence. However, the relationship 
between Christian theology and politics, in Moltmann’s thought, is a complex one 
which can only be understood in the context of eschatology.  
MOLTMANN’S	  ESCHATOLOGY:	  GOD	  WILL	  BE	  ALL	  IN	  ALL	  
 For Moltmann, eschatology is definitive of the way that human beings should 
understand their engagement in the present. The eschatological future that 
Moltmann describes, however, is not the disembodied after-life of so much Christian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	   Timothy	  Harvie,	  Jurgen	  Moltmann’s	  Ethics	  of	  Hope	  (Surrey:	  Ashgate,	  2009),	  7.	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folk-theology.19 Rather, he describes the future of creation as New Creation. In order 
to understand the future of the present creation, however, we must first understand 
its beginning. Moltmann’s theology of creation also springs from his Trinitarian 
theology. 
MOLTMANN’S	  THEOLOGY	  OF	  CREATION20	  
Moltmann’s trinitarian theology challenges modern analytic thinking and 
requires an “ecological” approach to theology. Modern scientific thought is 
essentially a rationalist mode of thinking that seeks to know in order to control and 
use. It views all objects as “equipment” or as objects intended for human use and 
consumption. This kind of thinking reduces the world to a human resource – the very 
anthropocentric error that, Gray claims, “encourages us to believe that, unlike any 
other animal, we can understand the natural world, and thereby bend it to our will.”21 
A consistently trinitarian approach to theology, and in particular to the doctrine of 
creation, cannot be defined by such a “monistic” approach. Moltmann explains: 
If a doctrine of creation is to be ecological, it must try to get away from 
analytical thinking, with its distinctions between subject and object, and 
must strive to learn a new, communicative and integrating way of thought. 
This means that it will have to revert to the pre-modern concept of reason as 
the organ of perception and participation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	   This	  is	  my	  own	  term,	  indicating	  the	  status	  of	  much	  of	  the	  “grass	  roots”	  theology	  of	  the	  (in	  
particular	  evangelical)	  church	  to	  be	  a	  form	  of	  folklore,	  passed	  on	  from	  person	  to	  person,	  but	  without	  
a	  sufficient	  grounding	  in	  scripture,	  tradition	  or	  academic	  theology.	   	  
20	   The	  term	  “creation”	  is	  used	  here,	  not	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  context	  of	  “creation	  and	  evolution”	  but	  
to	  refer	  to	  “nature	  as	  gift”	  and	  the	  implications	  that	  proceed	  from	  that,	  in	  contrast	  to	  a	  purely	  
materialist	  view	  of	  nature	  as	  resource.	  
21	   Gray,	  Straw	  Dogs,	  23.	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[T]he concern that motivates cognition changes. We no longer desire to 
know in order to dominate, or analyse and reduce in order to reconstruct. 
Our purpose is now to perceive in order to participate, and to enter into the 
mutual relationships of the living thing. 
[A] theological doctrine of creation in our own time is also guided by the will 
to find a way into the community of creation, to reawaken the awareness of 
that community and to restore it.22 
An “ecological” approach to a doctrine of creation overcomes Gray’s accusation of 
“anthropomorphism” against Christian theology, and demonstrates how Christian 
anthropology, far from causing the objectification and destruction of the world, can 
underwrite the “green” approach that Gray advocates. 
Like Gray, Moltmann is critical of modern conceptions of “nature”, and the 
Enlightenment faith in progress that is concomitant with such conceptions. The 
difference between modern and pre-modern conceptions is, in Moltmann’s view, the 
pursuit of power: “The acquisition of power, the increase of power, and the securing 
of power: these, together with ‘the pursuit of happiness,’ may be termed the values 
that actually prevail in modern civilizations.” 23  Consequently, when nature is 
objectified, human beings reduce themselves. 
[T]hrough this method the human being confronts nature from the outset and 
in principle as its ruler. He is no longer one member of the community of 
creation; he confronts creation as its lord and owner. Consequently he can 
no longer identify himself in terms of body and nature. He becomes merely 
the subject of cognition and will. The reduction of the natural environment to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	   Jürgen	  Moltmann,	  God	  in	  Creation:	  A	  New	  Theology	  of	  Creation	  and	  the	  Spirit	  of	  God	  (Fortress	  
Press,	  1993),	  2–4,	  passim.	  
23	   Ibid.,	  26.	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the status of mere objects corresponds to this subjectification of the human 
being.24 
A human being is understood only as a consumer and nature only as a resource for 
consumption. We are excluded from the “equilibrium” which pre-modern societies 
enjoyed and valued in their relationship to the natural world, the state of equilibrium 
that Gray praises as the exemplary virtue of the “Gaia hypothesis”, to which he 
subscribes.25 Moltmann’s criticism of “progress” is as stringent as Gray’s and runs 
along similar lines:  
Everywhere uncontrollable processes of growth have sprung up: growing 
populations, industrial growth, growing pollution, a growing use of energy, a 
growing exposure to stimuli, and growing mental and spiritual instability 
among men and women. These processes are interdependent and mutually 
accelerating. ‘Progress’ is no longer an expression of hope, as it was in the 
nineteenth century; it is a fate to which people in the industrial countries feel 
themselves condemned. When ancient civilized nations are assessed as 
‘under-developed’ or ‘developing’, this merely shows the mindless 
imperialism of this ideology of progress, which judges everything on the 
basis of its own condition, and which aims merely at its own hegemony.26 
Moltmann and Gray agree that progress is a destructive force, founded on an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	   Ibid.,	  27.	  Significantly,	  this	  is	  an	  insight	  that	  Moltmann	  attributes	  to	  Heidegger.	  
25	   Gray,	  Straw	  Dogs,	  33.	  Gray	  writes:	  “Gaia	  theory	  re-­‐establishes	  the	  link	  between	  humans	  and	  the	  
rest	  of	  nature	  which	  was	  affirmed	  in	  mankind’s	  primordial	  religion,	  animism.	  In	  monotheistic	  faiths	  
God	  is	  the	  final	  guarantee	  of	  meaning	  in	  human	  life.	  For	  Gaia,	  human	  life	  has	  no	  more	  meaning	  than	  
the	  life	  of	  slime	  mould.”	  Interestingly,	  Moltmann’s	  point	  is	  that	  it	  is	  precisely	  monotheism,	  in	  
contrast	  to	  Trinitarianism,	  that	  results	  in	  human	  exploitation	  of	  nature.	  However,	  the	  Gaia	  
Hypothesis	  simply	  reverses	  the	  power	  struggle,	  claiming	  superiority	  and	  dominance	  for	  the	  earth	  
over	  human	  beings,	  who	  are	  of	  little	  worth	  (as	  evidenced	  by	  their	  “slime	  mould”	  status	  in	  Gray’s	  
quote).	  
26	   Moltmann,	  God	  in	  creation,	  28.	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anthropocentric error that values all things only in terms of an individualistic 
personhood. 
 Not only has the analytic approach to the world resulted in the “ideology of 
progress”; it is also concomitant with violence. When entities, whether human or 
non-human, are understood as monads, and not through a Trinitarian ontology such 
as outlined above, then violence is an inevitable outcome. Moltmann makes this 
observation: 
[W]e should not … try to grasp the internal relationships of human society 
and the inner differences of individuals purely analytically, by way of more 
and more demarcations and exclusions … In definitions which are arrived at 
by way of exclusions and divisions, violence is made the principle.27  
The way that reality is conceived and related to determines its future. If irresolvable 
conflict is posited at the heart of human society, through an analytic hermeneutic, 
then violence is the outcome. Gray’s thought is consistent with this; in his values 
pluralism he posits an irresolvable conflict at the heart of social relations. 
Consequently, he views violence as inherent. But when individuals and society are 
viewed as parts of a larger, integrated Gestalt, the future of society can be construed 
in hope. 
Moltmann's doctrine of creation begins with the assertion that it belongs 
primarily to God. While Gray criticises Christianity for inaugurating an 
anthropocentric view of nature, Moltmann describes a Christian view of nature in the 
following terms: “If the world is God's creation, then it remains his property and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	   Ibid.,	  246.	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cannot be claimed by men and women. It can only be accepted as loan and 
administered as a trust.”28 Creation is a gift - but a gift on loan, not one which 
human beings can do with as they please.  
The consequence of viewing creation as gift affects the approach one must 
take to it. If it is God's gift, and not merely a resource appropriated to 
anthropocentric goals, then scientific "knowledge" is not an appropriate method for 
truly understanding the world. From the "faith" that the world is a gift from God, 
certain kinds of "knowledge" proceed. Moltmann writes: 
Through scientific terms we define, and through definitions we pin things 
down and make objects identifiable. But belief in creation only arrives at the 
understanding of creation when it recollects the alternative forms of 
meditative knowledge. 'We know to the extent to which we love,' said 
Augustine. Through this form of astonished, wondering and loving 
knowledge, we do not appropriate things. We recognise their independence 
and participate in their life. We do not wish to know so that we can dominate. 
We desire to know in order to participate. This kind of knowledge confers 
community.29 
The understanding of this world as creation, and in a trinitarian framework, invites a 
new perception that transcends anthropocentrism and unites human being and 
non-human being in community. It is obvious how necessary this kind of knowing is 
in a world now on the brink of ecological collapse because of humanity's history of 
domination of nature. Gray is clear that it is this “anthropocentric error” which has 
caused the current ecological crisis. Gray subscribes to “Gaia theory,” which, he 
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   Ibid.,	  30.	  
29	   Ibid.,	  32.	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argues, “re-establishes the link between humans and the rest of nature.”30 In fact, 
Gaia theory privileges nature over human being, and offers no hope for human 
society, only warnings. Moltmann, however, argues that: 
[I]f this anthropocentrism is replaced by a new cosmological theocentrism 
[then t]he creatures of the natural world are not there for the sake of human 
beings. Human beings are there for the sake of the glory of God, which the 
whole community of creation extols. The more human beings discover the 
meaning of their lives in joy in existence, instead of in doing and achieving, 
the better they will be able to keep their economic, social and political history 
within bounds.31 
Rather than privileging one or the other, as a monadic ontology is wont to do, a 
trinitarian ontology offers hope in the promise of harmony and communion between 
human beings and the earth in which human beings view themselves and the world 
theocentrically. This theology offers a genuine hope for humanity’s harmony with 
nature, as opposed to Gray’s apocalyptic predictions of human extinction and 
catastrophic conflicts engendered by resource scarcity.  
NEW	  CREATION	  
Moltmann's eschatology has significant implications for the way creation is 
viewed and for the kind of politics that it suggests. The end or telos of this creation is 
a new creation. Creation is not given as a static, once-and-for-all world. Rather, the 
Christian view of the world is teleological. This telos, as Gray points out in Black 
Mass, is the renewal of the heavens and the earth: “Jesus and his first disciples 
believed that the world was destined for imminent destruction so that a new and 
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   Gray,	  Straw	  Dogs,	  33.	  
31	   Moltmann,	  God	  in	  creation,	  139.	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perfect one could come into being.”32  However the transition occurs, whether 
through some kind of destruction or some more subtle transfiguration, Moltmann 
maintains that the future of creation cannot be annihilation: 
The expectation of ‘the end of the world’ is a vulgar error…it is gnostic in 
origin, not biblical… Anyone who believes in the God who created being out 
of nothing also believes in the God who gives life to the dead. This means 
that he hopes for the new creation of heaven and earth.33 
The future of present creation is as a renewed, material creation. New creation 
differs from the current creation in that God will make himself fully present to the new 
creation – he will indwell it, making it his “home”. “In the gift and through the powers 
of the Holy Spirit,” writes Moltmann, “a new divine presence is experienced in 
creation. God the creator takes up his dwelling in creation and makes it his home… 
The presence and efficacy of the Spirit is the eschatological goal of creation and 
reconciliation. All the works of God end in the presence of the Spirit.”34 When God is 
fully present in his creation, it becomes “glorified” and achieves the telos for which it 
was created. God becomes one with his creation, in much the same way that the 
members of the trinity are one – in a perichoresis – God indwells his creation and his 
creation is also “in him”. This is a vision of ultimate peace, where the whole cosmos 
is united and in harmony – harmony in human society and in human relations with 
creation - without being dissolved into sameness. Through the trinitarian ontology of 
oneness in diversity, the cosmos, as new creation, is able to attain to oneness while 
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   Gray,	  Black	  Mass,	  5.	  
33	   Moltmann,	  God	  in	  creation,	  93.	  
34	   Ibid.,	  96.	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maintaining its character as a plural, material creation. 
Understanding the relationship between “the heavens and the earth” is 
important for understanding Moltmann’s biblical eschatology and the utopian 
impulse that, as Gray has argued, emerges from a secularised version of the 
Christian hope. First, the dual nature of creation as heavens and earth is significant. 
Moltmann expresses cogently the significance of these two spheres of creation as 
follows: 
We call the side of creation which is open to God ‘heaven’. From heaven and 
through heaven God acts on earth. Heaven represents the relative ‘beyond’ 
of the world, and the earth is the relative ‘this-worldliness’ of heaven. In 
heaven creation has its relative transcendence. In the earth creation finds its 
relative immanence. The ec-centric world open to God possesses in itself the 
dialectical structure of transcendence and immanence.35 
As a creation possessing the qualities of immanence and transcendence, the 
dualities and dichotomies of actual/ideal and one/many are synthesised. The conflict 
between the universalism of the “one” and the limitations and variety of “the many” 
are resolved in this dialectic. Creation is always open to and informed by the 
universals, the ideal: “the heavens”, and the ideal, the good, is always being 
incarnated, achieving immanence in “the earth”. As was demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, Gray’s rejection of the notion of perfection due to the limits of 
rationality,36 and his concomitant rejection of teleology – of even the possibility of 
progress toward an ideal – stood in discordant antithesis to the implicit teleology of 
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his modus vivendi. Despite Gray’s claim that the plurality of values precludes the 
possibility of universal values, his own proposal aimed to bring unity to diverse ways 
of life under the value of peaceful coexistence, in order to achieve the good or telos 
of human flourishing. The dialectical notion of creation as “heavens and earth” 
reconciles the tension between “the one and the many”, the ideal and the actual, 
which is a problem not only for Gray’s philosophy, but also perennially for 
philosophy in general.37 
Moltmann identifies the utopian error that transforms Christian eschatology 
from God’s providential plan into a (potentially - and often actually - violent) human 
project. He describes it as the collapsing of the heavens-earth dialectic, thus 
denying the earth the possibility of transcendence. In Christian eschatology, the 
heavens and the earth will become one; the sphere of the actual will become also 
the sphere of the ideal, and vice versa, when Christ returns.38 However, when the 
heaven of the world to come (the new heaven and earth) is reduced to the heaven of 
the historical future of this creation, then the utopian impulse is born. Moltmann 
notes of Marx that he: 
…replaces the indissoluble duality of heaven and earth by the dissoluble 
difference between humanity’s present condition and its historical future. But 
this historical future can only be realized in the revolutionary imperative … At 
the same time, the all-human society must be nothing less than ‘heaven on 
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earth’ … But this means that this perfect, all-human – which is to say 
Communist – society must be a society without heaven.39 
Moltmann notes that the removal of the transcendence of the heavens from “above” 
to “before” us removes the prospect of hope for change and for a genuinely new 
future. The future will only be the pre-determined repetition of the past (as Gray 
assumes in his assertion of the cyclical nature of history).40 Moltmann insists that:  
[A] historical future without heaven cannot be the forecourt of hope and the 
motivation for any historical movement. A ‘transcending without 
transcendence’ … turns infinity into indefinite endlessness, and makes of the 
striving for fulfillment merely an ‘on and on’. …[H]eaven without God is 
incapable of making accessible to the earth a future in which men and 
women might seek for happiness, salvation, the disclosure of what is hidden, 
identity and essential being. Without God’s creative potentialities for the 
world, worldly potentialities remain determined by presently existing reality 
and are totally congruent with that.41 
 
Using the language of Millenarianism, it can be said that utopian thought 
reduces the millennium to a historical time, rather than seeing in it the transformation 
of time. Gray begins his account of Christian Millenarianism with Schweitzer’s 
account of Jesus’ ministry as characterised by disappointment that “the new 
kingdom did not arrive.” 42  However, Moltmann makes clear that Schweitzer’s 
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  God	  in	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   Gray,	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  23.	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   Moltmann,	  God	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  180–1.	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  Black	  Mass,	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anticipation of the millennium43 as an historical event within history is mistaken: 
Schweitzer … consistently abolished eschatology altogether. [His] error was 
to transpose eschatology into time, instead of seeing in eschatology a 
transformation of time itself. But true eschatology is not about future history; 
it is about the future of history. Anyone who, like Schweitzer, 'imperiously 
forces' eschatology into history has already abandoned it.  
The interpretation of the millennium as a future in time was congruent with the 
utopian thought of Schweitzer’s day. However, both Christian Millenarianism and 
utopianism (which is secular Millenarianism) are, for Moltmann, actually the 
abandonment of a true eschatology. 
Moltmann contrasts utopian thinking and historical Millenarianism with what 
he calls the “messianic” interpretation of eschatology. The ideal future is not to be 
historically located at “the end of history” as its consummation and as arising out of 
its past; it is not the logical conclusion of this world. However, it is still analogous to 
this world, and is the transformation of this world. The symbol of this hoped-for 
transformation, for the Christian, is the resurrection of Christ. Moltmann explains: 
Just as the raised Christ does not develop out of the crucified and dead 
Christ, the novum ultimum - the ultimate new thing - does not issue from the 
history of the old. Between the old and the new, the New Testament sets the 
death of Christ, and the dying-with-Christ-to-this-world symbolized by 
Christian baptism. The new thing is the surprising thing, the thing that could 
never have been expected.44 
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  and	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The future is not determined by the past, but neither is it discontinuous with it, in a 
way that would make the present irrelevant. The messianic future of the world is a 
transformation of the world; hence it is a hopeful future, and one that bears upon the 
present. 
 Christian eschatology is a doctrine of hope that seeks to free history from 
necessity and the determination of its past, in order to open the possibility of a new 
future. For Moltmann, the past is dominated by the paradigm of modernity and the 
apocalyptic future that (Gray agrees) it seems condemned to. With eschatology, 
however, a radically different future is made possible. Moltmann explains the 
determinacy of the past and the hope of the future as follows: 
The messianic interpretation of the experience of the moment that ends and 
gathers up time is the redemption of the future from the power of history. The 
power of history is exercised by the mighty. They have to extend their 
victorious present into the future in order to augment and consolidate their 
power. Their future is without an alternative, and devoid of surprises. It is no 
more than the prolongation of the present state of possession, and its 
expansion. Their future is therefore extrapolated from the tendencies and 
trends of their past and present. Their future is planned and projected future, 
for only the person who has the power to implement and enact can plan and 
project. If the modern world itself is 'the modernity project' undertaken by the 
powerful people in Western society, then the future of this project will be 
perceived in two ways by those caught up in it: as a chance for permanent 
modernization, and as the compulsion to progress. 'The person who rides on 
a tiger can never get off again', says the Chinese proverb. It is true that today 
there is very little optimism about the future in the modernity project, but in 
science and technology the pressure for progress is still unchanged, under 
'the compulsion' of competition. 
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The messianic interpretation sees 'the moment' that interrupts time, and lets 
us pause in the midst of progress, as the power for conversion. At that 
moment another future becomes perceptible. The laws and forces of the 
past are no longer 'compulsive'. God's messianic future wins power over the 
present. New perspectives open up. The deadliness of progress towards the 
economic, ecological, nuclear and genetic catastrophes is recognized; and 
the modern world's lack of future is perceived. The way becomes free for 
alternative developments. I should like to call this the redemption of the 
future from the power of history in the kairos of conversion. Only that will 
again make theological eschatology possible, for through that, hope as a 
theological category will be redeemed from the ruins of historical reason.45 
Like Gray, Moltmann finds no hope in the modern myth of progress; rather he makes 
similar predictions of disaster and extinction. However, Moltmann sees in Christian 
eschatology freedom from the necessity of this future – a future that, Gray thinks, 
may well be unavoidable. 
THE	  POLITICS	  OF	  ESCHATOLOGY	  
Ethics are the product of a telos, a goal or a view of the good toward which 
human beings strive. The Christian telos, as interpreted by Jürgen Moltmann, is a 
transformed cosmos, where God is the “all in all”46 – a cosmos that is united with 
itself and with God in ultimate peace and harmony, without being dissolved into 
sameness. This will result in harmony between human beings and between humanity 
and nature. This vision of the end informs Christian ethics, but in complex ways. In 
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his Jürgen Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope,47 Timothy Harvie explains how in Moltmann’s 
theology, a Christian eschatology informs a non-utopian ethics: 
It is noteworthy that redeemed humanity may not attempt to bring about 
God’s promised future. It is fundamental to Moltmann’s conception of hope 
that it is God in Christ alone who is able to create an eschatological future. 
However, a community defined by its hope for the eschatological future does 
act in ways commensurate with this future.”48 
Human beings cannot bring about God’s future for the world – that is not the 
motivation for a Christian ethics. Rather, Christian ethics is shaped by the future that 
is promised by God. Even the ability to live in ways commensurate with that future is 
a gift of God through the Spirit. As Harvie explains: 
Thus, there is both an open and a closed aspect to the possibility of human 
participation in the Kingdom of God. It is open ethically to human 
involvement as life empowered by the Spirit to live commensurately with the 
eschatological Kingdom of God through liberating praxis and restoration of 
the earth. It is closed to human involvement in the sense that consummation 
of the Kingdom can only come about through the eschatological working of 
God – that is, the resurrection of the dead and the redemption of the 
cosmos.49 
Humanity may live in ways commensurate with the “Kingdom” but humans do not 
bring it into being. Rather, their lives are determined by that future more than by the 
past. 
The new future opened up by the promise of God in Christ’s resurrection – the 
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promise of a transformed cosmos – provides a new “ethical space” for human 
beings. This space is a “between-space” or “interval”50 between the promise of the 
future that God will bring about, and the consummation of that promise. It opens 
history to a new future, and enables human beings to participate in that future 
through the power of the Spirit. Harvie explains it as follows: 
This between-space is in essence the content and form of the promised 
future … but enacted through the creative work of God in such a way that in 
Christ humans may now participate in this space. The space is in 
contradistinction to the world as it preceded the creative work in the promise 
while at the same time re-creating that world through a setting-in-force 
bringing history to consummation. In this sense, Christian hope and the 
fulfillment of the promise remain entirely the work of God and yet 
simultaneously remain a sphere for human participation.51 
The between-space stands “in contradistinction to the world” in that it exists in ways 
commensurate with the new future of peace and harmony, rather than the imperfect 
past.  
The between-space created by God’s promise in Christ is a space of political 
liberation, for the Christian. Moltmann notes that the character of Christian moral 
praxis is informed by both the perichoretic nature of the Trinity, which finds its life in 
the other, and in the expression of this essential nature in Christ’s identification with 
the weak, poor and sinful.52 The consequent political praxis, then, is one of solidarity 
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and political liberation. In this way, as Harvie explains, Moltmann’s conception of 
Christian political praxis avoids being utopian: 
[T]he themes arising from the love witnessed in the Trinitarian history of the 
Son is a life-giving openness for the other. However, because these hopes 
are rooted in the cross and its inseparability from the resurrection, it is not a 
utopian hope. Instead, it is a hope which enters the eschatologically 
unfulfilled situations of the present in open, loving solidarity with those who 
suffer. Thus, as instruments of God empowered by the Spirit for the 
Kingdom, Christian moral action becomes not just a ‘walking with’ suffering, 
but a journey towards eschatological healing and redemption…This 
eschatological understanding of Christian moral living, when seen in 
Trinitarian perspective, necessarily leads from psychological liberation to 
political liberation.53 
An ethics informed by the future, but rooted not in human agency but in God’s 
power to resurrect that future from a “dead” past, enables human beings to engage 
in hopeful political action toward liberation for all who suffer. While freed from the 
responsibility to make that future happen, they are empowered by the presence of 
that future through God’s empowering presence in the Spirit.54 
The character of Christian praxis, as determined by its eschatology, must be 
anti-violent and inherently peaceful. A telos of ultimate peace does not by itself 
automatically guarantee a peaceful ethic. As Gray shows55, peaceful ends have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	   Harvie,	  Jurgen	  Moltmann’s	  Ethics	  of	  Hope,	  135–6.	  
54	   Due	  to	  limitations	  of	  space,	  it	  will	  have	  to	  suffice,	  by	  way	  of	  explanation,	  for	  it	  to	  be	  noted	  here	  
that	  the	  Spirit	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “downpayment”	  or	  “pledge”	  (Gk.	  arrabon)	  in	  the	  New	  Testament	  
–	  he	  is	  the	  partial	  presence	  and	  guarantee	  of	  the	  future,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  power	  that	  enables	  that	  
future	  to	  be	  realized.	  
55	   Gray,	  Black	  Mass.	  
	   128	  
frequently used to justify violent means. However, the character of the Christian telos 
is unique in that, as divine promise, it is guaranteed as a gift, so that ethical causality 
is reversed. Rather than acting in a particular way to bring about a particular 
outcome, in Christian eschatology, the promised outcome informs a particular way 
of acting. The future works towards the present, transforming it. When combined 
with a trinitarian anthropology of persons as relations, the praxis of the present is 
construed as determinedly peaceful, loving and liberating. The character of Christian 
ethics as empowered by the future means that the poverty and violence of the 
present are actively resisted and transformed. Moltmann writes that: “anyone who 
really says ‘yes’ to life says ‘no’ to war. Anyone who really loves life says ‘no’ to 
poverty. So the people who truly affirm and love life take up the struggle against 
violence and injustice. They refuse to get used to it. They do not conform. They 
resist.”56 Or from another perspective; if, as trinitarian anthropology insists: “the 
other person is no longer the limitation of my freedom; he is an expansion of it,”57 
then violence toward the other is unthinkable – it is violence toward oneself. In this 
ontology, oneness, wholeness, peace and prosperity can only happen together. Only 
as a united whole can human beings find fulfillment and completion in their identity 
as persons. 
SUMMARY	  
Jürgen Moltmann’s theology demonstrates how a Christian eschatology, 
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combined with a trinitarian ontology, provides the intellectual resources for engaging 
in a hopeful and peaceful ethics that works toward universal solidarity and liberation. 
While such a lofty telos seems unattainable for human beings, Moltmann 
demonstrates that it is its very nature as “promise” that relieves human beings of 
responsibility to create this future. It is God’s future, promised in the death and 
resurrection of Christ, and guaranteed in the gift of the Spirit, who is the presence of, 
and the empowerment to live in ways commensurate with, this future. Human beings 
who engage in the pursuit of this future can thereby work in hope to transform the 
present, without the need to sacrifice it to the future. Rather, the past has been taken 
up and sacrificed already in Christ, and through resurrection has been transformed 
into the redeemed future.   
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CHAPTER	  5:	  CONCLUSIONS	  
John Gray’s central assertion in Black Mass is that “Modern politics is a 
chapter in the history of religion.”1  He claims that modern politics has 
adopted the Christian idea of salvation, albeit in secularised form, and that 
this has made modern politics both teleological and utopian. The 
consequence of this has been that modern politics is inevitably violent, as the 
present peace is sacrificed in order to bring about the ideal future. In Gray’s 
thought, values pluralism destroys all such notions of “the ideal”. Values 
pluralism is the idea that human values are irreducibly plural. Therefore there 
can be no ideal system to which politics may aspire, since the 
incommensurability of values, and their inability to be combined without loss 
negates the idea of the perfect. Gray proposes that a modus vivendi – a 
system that enables a plurality of value-laden cultures to coexist peacefully, 
through political negotiations – is the best system for a values pluralist.  
Gray also claims that values pluralism negates the notion of teleology 
and consequently negates the notion of human meaning. If there is no ideal 
(as Gray claims there isn’t) to which human beings may strive, then the idea of 
human meaning - including the Enlightenment ideal of progress - is 
meaningless. Gray is pessimistic about human life and its future. He 
subscribes to Gaia theory, which understands the Earth as an organism that, 
like all organisms, always finds equilibrium. Gray predicts that human beings 
will either destroy themselves through ecological disaster, political conflict 
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that is motivated by the scarcity of resources, or at least have the human 
population significantly reduced as a consequence of our ecological disaster.  
In my critique of Gray I have highlighted the inherent teleology and 
privileging of values in his modus vivendi. By virtue of being a vision of “the 
Good,” Gray’s modus vivendi is as much a telos – albeit a sub-ideal or 
contingent telos2 - as the political systems that he critiques. Furthermore, it 
privileges a form of relativism over those who hold to universal notions of 
truth. In fact, the plurality of cultures that Gray wishes to bring together in a 
modus vivendi are, many of them, dependent on a belief in the universality of 
their values for their existence. Consequently, Gray’s modus vivendi is a 
privileging of the value of peaceful coexistence in a universalising way at the 
expense of other universal values.  
Gray’s values pluralism is an assumption about the world, and 
performs the same role in his thought that ideas such as progress and 
meaning do in the Enlightenment thinking of which he is so critical. Gray 
labels these assumptions “faiths” or “myths”; he writes of “Enlightenment 
faith”3 and “the myth of progress,”4 arguing that these beliefs about the 
world are articles of faith, rather than truths about the world. Gray’s own 
values pluralism, however, is no less a faith. It is an assumption about the 
irreducible plurality of human life that is insufficiently justified by Gray. Critics 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	   I	  define	  this	  term	  in	  my	  critique	  of	  Gray	  as:	  a	  telos	  that	  is	  contingent	  on	  the	  
imperfectability	  of	  human	  existence,	  rather	  than	  one	  that	  is	  founded	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  human	  
perfection.	  
3	   Gray,	  Black	  Mass,	  104.	  
4	   Gray,	  Al	  Qaeda	  and	  What	  It	  Means	  to	  Be	  Modern,	  118.	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of Gray have noted that he rejects the myth of progress in favour of his own 
“myth of diversity.” 5 
Gray’s own argument, it appears, is also a history in the chapter of 
religion. He rejects notions of ultimate unity in favour of an ultimate plurality, 
and this is an article of faith for him. Consequently his vision of the good is as 
prone to violence as those who destroy plurality in the pursuit of oneness. A 
modus vivendi destroys the possibility of a universal pursuit of truth and 
meaning. Further, Gray’s ontology (or rejection of any ontology) brings human 
life to the brink of the nihil, where actually not even a modus vivendi is 
possible. Gray’s anthropology reduces human life to a meaningless, material 
existence that can offer no reason for choosing peace over conflict or tyranny 
over democracy. In Gray’s view, this is the plain truth about human existence, 
and one that human beings avoid through their faith in the “illusion” of human 
meaning. This illusion is one that Gray believes is necessary, which reveals a 
conflict in his thought – he believes meaning to be an illusion, but he doubts 
that human beings can live without this illusion. This reduces his view of 
human life almost to absurdity. In my critique of Gray, I have noted that the 
fact that human beings assume a meaning for their lives perhaps indicates 
that Gray’s faith (given that his assertion of human meaninglessness rests on 
his faith in values pluralism) may be misplaced.  
In my final chapter I have outlined the broad strokes of a Christian 
theology, as presented in the thought of Jürgen Moltmann, that addresses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	   Morgan,	  “Gray’s	  Elegy	  for	  Progress,”	  125.	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Gray’s main concerns. Beginning from the prototypical trinitarianism of the 
Christian faith, Moltmann describes the consequent Christian ontology and 
anthropology in terms that demonstrate the inherent peacefulness of 
Christian theology. Furthermore, the Trinity is a complex idea that provides for 
the resolution of the primordial conflict between “the one and the many.” 
Trinitarian thinking also redefines human being as “persons in relation”; an 
idea that posits a potential harmony as fundamental to all human being; one 
that offers the promise of genuine human unity without the threat of dissolving 
human individuality. In fact, sociality and individuality are mutually reinforcing, 
in a trinitarian anthropology. Not only does this resolve tensions within human 
sociality; it also provides hope for the planet in providing the intellectual 
resources for an ecological understanding of nature as “creation” – as a gift 
that human beings cannot merely objectify as pure resource, but which they 
must stand in relation to as fellow creatures.  
Moltmann’s theology also describes a Christian eschatology that can 
underpin a peaceful and hopeful ethical engagement with the social and 
natural worlds. Moltmann describes a “between space” of ethical 
engagement, whereby human beings are caught between the present and the 
perfect future inaugurated through Christ’s death and resurrection. This 
“between space” frees human beings from the hopeless determinacy of the 
past, without allowing them to indulge in a Promethean utopianism, of the 
kind that Gray describes as ultimately violent. This has the ability to rescue 
human kind from the character of modern life as interminable progress – a 
similarly Promethean punishment of endless repetition of that which has gone 
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before. Both Gray and Moltmann agree that the modern age is condemned to 
the excesses and impending doom of ecological collapse if a new way of 
being that surpasses modern consciousness is not embraced.  
TOWARD	  A	  NEW	  CONSCIOUSNESS	  
It is to the shape and direction of this future consciousness that this 
discussion now inevitably points. While the limits of space will allow only a 
cursory glance in this direction, this conclusion will highlight where fruitful 
research into this field may begin.  
In his rejection of human meaning, Gray turns to Martin Heidegger’s 
idea of Gelassenheit, or “releasement” as he translates it. Gray describes 
Gelassenheit as “the mode of ‘releasement’ in which we let things be rather 
than aiming wilfully to transform them or subject them to our purposes.”6 
Gray sees this mode of being as the answer to the problems of 
anthropocentrism. In establishing a new relationship with the earth that is not 
solely based on human subjectivity, Gray believes “that a turn in our inherited 
traditions of thought is accomplished, which opens up the possibility of 
profoundly different forms of human community dwelling together on the 
earth in peace.”7 Gray also sees in Heidegger’s Gelassenheit, a turn toward 
Schopenhauer and his rejection of willing, writing that in his turn toward 
Gelasseneit, Heidegger “did little more than return to Schopenhauer by a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	   Gray,	  Enlightenment’s	  Wake,	  229.	  
7	   Ibid.	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roundabout route.”8 Gray writes that the essence of Schopenhauer’s thought 
on the rejection of willing is the idea “that we achieve compassion for other 
living things by ‘turning away from the Will’ – by ceasing to care about our 
own well-being and survival.”9 In this way, Gray sees humanism as finally 
surpassed, and the error of anthropocentrism, with its inherent teleology and 
concomitant “meaning” for human life, is undone.  
Putting aside for now the vision of “profoundly different forms of 
human community dwelling together on the earth in peace,”10 and the strong 
resemblance this has to the Christian vision of the New Creation, it is 
interesting to note how profoundly Trinitarian this mode of being is. In the 
turning away from the self to the other, genuine community is found – the 
antithesis between individuality and sociality is surpassed and synthesized. 
Julian Young, writes of the later Heidegger’s thought in this regard in his The 
Death of God and the Meaning of Life,11 in reference to the festival or 
“holy-day” which enabled the ancient and medieval cultures to maintain an 
understanding of the world as more than a mere resource. Young describes 
the character of Heidegger’s mode of being (where Heidegger writes that 
human beings step into “the full breadth of the space proper to his essence”12 
thus: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	   Gray,	  Straw	  Dogs,	  52.	  
9	   Ibid.,	  46.	  
10	   Gray,	  Enlightenment’s	  Wake,	  229.	  
11	   Julian	  Young,	  The	  Death	  of	  God	  and	  the	  Meaning	  of	  Life	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2003).	  
12	   Martin	  Heidegger,	  The	  Question	  Concerning	  Technology	  and	  Other	  Essays,	  trans.	  W.	  Lovitt	  
(New	  York:	  Harper	  and	  Row,	  1977),	  16.	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The wooded hillside…shows up not merely as a store of building 
material but also as a hillside that is home to the flora and fauna that 
inhabit it. Second, we step into an intuitive sense of our world as 
nature’s poeisis. We step, that is, out of ‘the dull overcastness of the 
everyday’ and into ‘the radiance’ that comes from an intuitive 
apprehension of the infinite depth, the boundlessness of Being. And 
we step, too, into ‘the wonder that around us a world worlds, that 
there is something rather than nothing, that there are things, and that 
we ourselves are in their midst’. We step, in other words, into an 
apprehension of our world as something granted to us, something 
which, rather than being of course there, is something which might 
not have been, something fragile and precious. As a result, we 
experience a profound sense of ‘gratitude’, gratitude for the 
‘clearing’, for illumination, for light, gratitude that there is something 
rather than nothing. This is what makes the festive state festive – a 
celebration.13 
Just as in the Christian vision that Moltmann presents, the world can only be 
truthfully apprehended as gift, and in that joyful relation of appreciation and 
care for it. 
The consequence of Heidegger’s thought is that, far from being the 
rejection of meaning, a meaning is secured for human being through this 
mode of being. That meaning, in Heidegger’s thought, is having “a 
fundamental project: to be guardians of our world.”14 Here is a universal 
meaning, which can provide a telos toward which human beings may strive. 
By world, not only nature is intended, but human beings also, as included in 
that world. Our telos is the fruitful flourishing and care of this world as a unity. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	   Young,	  The	  Death	  of	  God	  and	  the	  Meaning	  of	  Life,	  207.	  
14	   Ibid.,	  209.	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Heidegger’s Gelassenheit is not a nihilistic end of all willing; rather it is a 
deeper appreciation and knowing of the world; a knowing that reveals the 
world’s true nature as gift, and human beings’ own nature as inherently 
connected to this world, with a vocation to sustain and care for it, enabling it 
to flourish. The correlation between Heidegger’s festive mode of being and 
the Christian perception of Nature as “creation” and hence a gift, is 
unmistakable. It is well noted that Heidegger draws his notion of Gelassenheit 
from Christian mystics; particularly Meister Eckhart. 15  It appears that 
Moltmann and Gray, by virtue of his appropriation of Heidegger, are in 
agreement that the way forward for humankind lies in this approach to the 
world; in the encountering of the world as it is in itself, rather than as it is 
useful for human needs and purposes.  
Gray’s anthropology does not allow for human beings to be defined by 
anything other than their needs. Consequently, it is unlikely that his 
anthropology could support such a self-transcending, meditative approach to 
the world. However, the psychology of Abraham Maslow suggests a possible 
way forward, and a resolution between Gray’s definition of human beings as 
motivated by animal needs, and a more theological anthropology that 
suggests that human beings are most themselves when they can transcend 
themselves through the contemplation of the other. Maslow is best known for 
his “hierarchy of needs”16 that defines human beings as motivated by needs 
(in agreement with Gray), but that states that when lower needs are met (like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	   Gray,	  Enlightenment’s	  Wake,	  273.	  
16	   Abraham	  Maslow,	  Motivation	  and	  Personality	  (New	  York:	  Harper	  and	  Bros.,	  1954).	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the “animal needs”, which Gray believes constitute our nature – needs like 
food, sex, shelter) then higher needs become dominant (such as the need to 
belong, to have significance and to be loved). In this anthropology, human 
beings are not one static thing, but have the potential to become 
“self-actualised”. The state of self-actualization is one that few reach, but it 
represents the highest possibilities of human nature. For those who attain this 
state, the meditative, self-transcendent knowing of the world and others is 
characteristic of their state. Maslow writes: 
Self-actualising people are, without one single exception, involved in 
a cause outside their own skin, in something outside of themselves. 
They are devoted, working at something, something which is very 
precious to them – some vocation or calling in the old sense, the 
priestly sense. They are working at something which fate has called 
them to somehow and which they work at and which they love so that 
the work-joy dichotomy in them disappears. One devotes his life to 
the law, another to justice, another to beauty or truth. All, in one way 
or another, devote their lives to the search for what I have called the 
“being” values …the ultimate values which are intrinsic, which cannot 
be reduced to anything more ultimate…They are the values of 
being.17 
In Maslow’s anthropology, then human beings are both motivated by their 
needs, but potentially motivated by “ultimate values”. Hence, human nature is 
not fixed; rather human beings can be a range of higher or lower selves. Gray 
builds his thought only on the lower potentialities of human nature. For this 
kind of human being the ultimate values are not present; they cannot 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	   Abraham	  Maslow,	  The	  Farther	  Reaches	  of	  Human	  Nature,	  An	  Esalen	  Book	  (New	  York:	  
Viking	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comprehend them. 
Maslow’s self-actualizer’s perceive the world in Heidegger’s “festive” 
mode of being, or with Gelassenheit; non-actualizers are purely 
anthropocentric, displaying the traits that Gray ascribes to modern thinking. 
Maslow contrasts the two ways of being. The perception of actualizers is as 
follows: “The object is permitted to be itself. Humble, receptive, passive 
choiceless, undemanding. Taoistic, non-interference with the object or 
percept. Let-be acceptance.”18 This is Gelassenheit. For the non-actualizers, 
their perception is thus: “Active shaping, organizing, and selecting by the 
perceiver. He shifts it, he rearranges it. He works at it…Trying, striving, effort. 
Will, control.” 19  This is the modern attitude, the one that Gray defines 
humanity by. In this way of perceiving, there are no eternal values, only the 
willing of the self. Of course, people may be a mixture of these two states at 
any time, but the point is clear that if there are no universals for Gray, it is 
because he only recognizes the lower form of human being. The Gelassenheit 
which he points to as the future for human beings, is not a possible future for 
Gray’s “straw dogs”; human beings defined only by their animal needs. For 
beings such as these, their existence may well be meaningless. 
Maslow’s thought also highlights the dialectic between human beings 
and society – the aforementioned antithesis between individuality and 
sociality. Gray defines human sociality as an irresolvable conflict between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	   Ibid.,	  251.	  
19	   Ibid.	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individuality and sociality. His proposal of a modus vivendi is an attempt to 
limit the loss to individuals, through the arena of political negotiation. Maslow, 
however, sees the relationship in more dialectical terms. The relationship 
between individuals and their society is a mutually transformative one. 
Individual and society are in a dialectical relationship, such that, as one 
improves, so does the other. Maslow writes, in regard to the individual and 
the society (world, in his words): 
They happen simultaneously and can be set off on either side, i.e., the 
more whole the world becomes, the more whole the person 
becomes. And also, the more whole the person becomes, the more 
whole becomes the world. It is a dynamic interrelation, a mutual 
causation…. The communication relationship between the person 
and the world is a dynamic one of mutual forming and lifting-lowering 
of each other, a process that we may call “reciprocal isomorphism.” A 
higher order of persons can understand a higher order of knowledge; 
but also a higher order of environment tends to lift the level of the 
person, just as a lower order of environment tends to lower it. They 
make each other like each other. These notions are also applicable to 
the interrelations between persons, and should help us to understand 
how persons help to form each other.20 
Just as human nature is not fixed, so also the potential for human society is 
not fixed. Rather they are dependent on each other. Again, the Trinitarian 
nature of human social life is evident – things work not in isolation but in 
mutual interdependence. 
Gray is correct that human beings can have no meaning for their lives, 
if we define their lives simply as that of “straw dogs” – of beings driven only 
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by their animal needs. Their only meaning can be that of consuming and 
conflicting with others who seek to consume the same scarce resources. 
Nihilism and destruction are the end of this being. However, if human beings 
can also practice Gelassenheit; if they can come to know this world, and their 
place in it as being of the character of a gift, then joy, and an ever increasing 
commitment to ultimate values of peace, justice and beauty and above all to 
the value of love – to the transcending of their individuality through the other – 
then human being has a hopeful future. It is a future where the antithesis and 
conflict between individual and society are transcended and where all things 
will be made one; it will be the fulfillment of the vision that Gray projects in 
Enlightenment’s Wake, with “profoundly different forms of human community 
dwelling together on the earth in peace.”21 
Finally, Gray makes a significant contribution to modern political 
discourse in identifying the Enlightenment ideal as violent and as an 
essentially “religious” impulse, derived from the ubiquitous human need to 
find meaning in life, and hence to posit a telos, from which we may derive the 
values that will enable us to achieve this vision of the “the Good, the Beautiful 
and the True.” However, in rejecting all ontological and teleological proposals 
as erroneous, Gray does not provide himself with an adequate platform on 
which to ground his modus vivendi. Rather, his thought tends toward nihilism 
and therefore cannot distinguish between violent or peaceful ways of life as 
being of any more or less value. Gray describes modern utopian politics as a 
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“Black Mass” – a perversion of Christian hopes that ends in violence – and in 
fact Gray’s own proposal, with its vision of peaceful human community is 
much closer to the vision projected in the authentic Christian Mass. However, 
it is similarly a parody and a performance of similarly faith-inspired hopes but 
without an adequate foundation to ground it. Gray’s thought is similar to the 
“Black Mass” that he critiques, but with a more peaceful vision; a “Gray 
Mass” perhaps.
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